the highest poverty
Nathan on Ben here:
The presiding unAbbot was Ben Vickers, 27 years old, with patches of gray on either side of his well-trimmed hair and a hooded black coat worn over his banded-collar black shirt. While also more or less retaining his post as “curator of digital” for London’s Serpentine Galleries, Vickers was the unMonastery’s chief theorist and coordinator; the others generally praised his ability to digest and summarize their various points of view, and to document them on the online platforms they use to communicate. He blasted George Michael while setting up breakfast and found a certain glee in the prospect of failure—a turn of mind probably honed during his days in doomed anarchist squats. But documentation can trump even failure; others can study the attempt, tweak it and try again.
r: ben – on how unmonastery ites are so un bounded ish.. and this fundamental thing is rules. in the monasteries, it was guilt and in hierarchical iterations of the monasteries; violence.
i don’t want to use either.. so i recommend: experimentations. ie: we haven’t tried this before, lets see what happens if we ie: wake at 5am. then share analysis….also on monasticism, read the agamben’s the highest poverty (not available for rec on overdrive) (earlier said read it because we’re wasting time on monasticism) .. the power of the rule; rules are obeyed in the eyes of god, upon the self. the self in this way is not accountable to the group, any more than they want to participate and judge this as a necessary lubricant for that participation..
to the book..
by Giorgio Agamben
Giorgio Agamben (Italian: [aˈɡambɛn]; born 22 April 1942) is an Italian philosopher best known for his work investigating the concepts of the state of exception,form-of-life (borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein) and homo sacer. The concept of biopolitics (borrowed from Michel Foucault) informs many of his writings.
the highest poverty – published 2011
in which both rule and life lose their familiar meaning in order to point in the direction of a third thing. our task is precisely to bring this third thing to light.
(on ben asking what third way is p 35 of uncode) – i’d say – third thing if you like – as eudaimonia… and the dance via attachment as eudaimoniative surplus.. so how to create/uncover an operating system that can facilitate that.. mechanism simple enougn – grounding/facilitating the chaos of 7 billion set free to eudaimonia – 100%/singularity ness/third way ness.
the great temptation of the monks was not that which painting of the quattrocento have fixed in the seminude female figure and in the shapeless monsters that assail anthony in his heritage, but the will to construct their life as a total and unceasing liturgy or divine office.
liturgy – ritual
in one case as in the other, what remained untouched was perhaps the most precious legacy of franciscanism, to which the west must return ever anew to contend with it as its undeferrable task: how to think a form-of-life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. that is to say again: to think life as that which is never given as property but only as a common use.
such a task will demand the elaboration of a theory of use – of which western philosophy lacks even the most elementary principles – and, moving forward from that, a critique of the operative and governmental ontology that continues, under various disguises, to determine the destiny of the human species.
ch 1 – birth of the rule
they (all these texts) are not, finally, hypomneumata or ethical exercises, like those that michel foucault has analyzed from the late classical world. and yet their central preoccupation is precisely that of governing the life and customs of men, both singularly and collectively.
parody in 1534.. ..gargantua used to say, the greatest waste of time he knew of was to count the hours – what good comes of that? (on no clocks in monasteries) and the greatest folly in the world was to govern oneself by the ring of a bell and not at the dictation of good sense and understanding.
all their life was laid out not by laws, statutes, or rules but according to their will and free choice… do what you will
it has been said that theleme was the antimonastery.. yet.. it is not simply a matter of an inversion of order into disorder and of rule into anomia..even if contracted into only one sentence, a rule exists and has an author.. thus gargantua has established it. and in the end that it intends is, despite the point by point dismissal of every obligation and the unconditional liberty of each, perfectly homogenous with that of the monastic rule: cenoby – the common life, the perfection of a common life in all and for all, live harmoniously in a house pleasantly … by this freedom they were all moved by laudable emulation to do what they saw a single one liked..
the rabelaisian parody, though comical in appearance, is thus so serious that one ca compare the episode of theleme to the franciscan foundation of a new type of order: the common life, by identifying itself with the rule without remainder, abolishes and cancels it.
it can appear surprising that the monastic idea, born as an individual and solitary flight from the world, should have given origin to a model of total communitarian life.
the theme of the common life.. via acts… were together and had all things in common… were of one heart and one soul, and no one claimed private ownership .. but everything they owned was held in common act 4:32… augustine’s rule defines as the first goal fo the monastic life :that you dwell in unity ..
the idea of a common life seems to have an obvious political meaning. in the politics, aristotle defines the city as a perfect community – koinonia teleios.. and makes use of the term syzen to live together.. to define the political nature of humans.. they desire to live together. yet he never speaks of a koinos bios. the polis is certainly born with view toward living, but its reason for existing is living well….. the monastery, lie the polis, is a community that intends to realize the perfection of the cenobial life… cassian therefore distinguishes the monastery from cenoby, because a monastery is the name of the residence and does not imply more than the place where the monks life. house of cenobites points to the character and the way of life of the profession. the residence of a simple monk can be called a monastery. but a place cannot be termed a house of cenobites unless one means a community of many people living together. cenoby does not name only a place but first of all a form of life.
the sense of this articulation.. obites.. orites.. aites… … becomes clear, however, only if one understand that what is in question is not the opposition between solitude and common life, so much as the (so to speak) ‘political’ opposition between order and disorder, governance and anarchy stability and nomadism.
explaining significance of parts of monks’ clothing
went from clothing and way of life interconnected to distinction between clerical habit and secular habit
foucault has shown that at the threshold of the industrial revolution, the disciplinary apparatuses (schools, barracks, colleges, the first real factories) had begun to divide periods of time into successive or parallel segments already from the end of the 17th cent, in order then to obtain a more efficient complex result through the combination of the individual chronological series…. the rigor of this scansion not only had no precedents in the classical world, but in its strict absoluteness it has perhaps never been equaled in any institution of modernity, not even the factory of taylor.p 20i have not allowed you any way to be ignorant of the hours of time… 6th centp 21last para – every moment has a duty22top – unceasing prayer.. on the clockcassian… whole purpose of monk… dedicated to prayer24top – sanctification of time vs sanctification if life by timemid – hybrid of time and life as meditation.. but earlier meditation was from memory.. later from readingend – meditation is store of tons of text in mind25memory went beyond silent reading(which allowed for silence).. to being able to work and recite… silently … at same timewithout any need for lectico
27the perfect life coincides with the legibility of the world, sin with the impossibility of reading (with its becoming illegible).ch 2 – rule and law29the lord grant, reads the conclusion of the rule of augustine, that you observe all these things with joy.. not as slaves under the law but as those who have ben set free by grace…
to a monk who asked him how he should behave with his disciples, palamon, the legendary mast of pachomius, responds: be their example, not their legislator…
in the same sense, mar abraham, upon laying out the rule of his monastery, recalls that we must not consider ourselves ‘legislators, neither for ourselves nor for others’
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/dtapscott/status/667110255587926016
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/666775010330222592
30the ambiguity is evident in the pachomian praecepta atque iudicia, which begins with eh resolutely antilegalistic statement – love is the fulfillment of the law – plenitudo legis caritas, only to enunciate immediately afterward a series of matters of an exclusively penal character.. bacht p 255penal system of monks – excommunication.. removed from people.. gatherings to eat.. blessings on food. … and if remains arrogant.. by 9th hr of 3rd day… confined/whipped to point of death.. and if the abbot so please, expelled from the monastery.
32it could not be more clearly said that the precepts that the monk must observe are to be assimilated to the rules of an art rather than to a legal apparatus.33in this sense, the monastery is perhaps the first place in which life itself – and not only the ascetic techniques that form and regulate it – was presented as an art. this analogy must not be understood, however, in the sense of an aestheticization of existence, but rather i the sense that michel foucault seemed to have in mind in his last writings, namely a definition of life itself in relation to a never-ending practice.
the absence of all shalom. – bryant myers
up to 42 (at least)
ugh to all the policy/promises/punishments/obligation/verbiages/professions.. no?
ch 3 – flight from the world and constitution
what is in question, in the life of cenoby, is thus a transformation of the very canon of human practice, which has been so determinate for the ethics of politics of western society that perhaps still today we cannot fully grasp its nature and implications.
ll. liturgy and rule
ch1 – regula vitae
but if we must follow regularity, varro writes, either we must observe that regularity which is present in ordinary usage, or we must observe also that which is not found there. if we must follow that which is present, there is no need of rules, because when we follow usage, regularity attends us..
a case for whimsy?
which seems at this point silly that i’m seeking a case from this writing. this writing is bound up in rules of rules.. so opposite to begin with. debating whether a word is said a certain way.. assuming that the sayer carries that much weight. i don’t know.
ie: is this a matter of a subjective genitive .. or an objective genitive…it is a subjective genitive, then, even if in a special sense..
oh my .. the rules ness..
ch 2 – orality and writing
putting in writing and setting in order a rule that might be kept in the monastery for the progress of the brothers..
it seemed appropriate that when someone wants to be converted from the world to he monastery, the rule be read to him when he enters.
the rule, that is to say, stages something that is not exhausted in either of these dimensions (written and oral), but finds its truth precisely and solely in the tension that it installs between them. neither written word nor living voice, the rule constantly moves between these polarities, in search of an ideal of the perfect common life that is precisely meant to define.
meant to define..? what if that is what is keeping us from us.. killing us…
by reading the rule that prescribes to hi the reading of the rule, the reader performatively executes the rule ipso facto. his lectio realizes, that is to say, the exemplary instance of an enunciation of the rule that coincides with its execution of an observance that is rendered indiscernible from the command that it obeys.
the dialectic between orality and writing is perfected here: there is a written text but in reality it only lives through the reading that is made of it.
the rule presupposed a precedence of writing, but what is at stake is a writing that is inert in itself, which must be ‘put into use’ by its reading.
ah.. the printing press. unleashing mankind.
this is confirmed some pages later, where it recommends that the traveling monk do the reading and, if he cannot, have recourse to meditatio, to recitation from memory, ‘in order to give the rule its due each day’…. lectio and meditatio belong constitutively to the rule and define its status.
ch 3 – the rule as a liturgical text
if we turn now to he problem of the nature of monastic rules, it is possible then to advance the hypothesis that the rule of the master, by making the rule the object of a lectio continua, in reality decisively affirms its liturgical status.
while the unworthy priest remains in any case a priest and the sacramental acts he carries out do not lose their validity, an unworthy monk is simply not a monk.
from this perspective, the protestant reformation can be seen legitimately as the implacable claim, promoted by Luther (an augustinian monk) of the monastic liturgy against the church liturgy.
the greek term leitourgia derives from laos (people) and ergon (work) and means – public tribute, service for the people. the term belongs originally to the political lexicon and designates the services that well to do citizens owe to the polis (organizing public games, arming a trireme, staging a chorus for the city’s festivals). aristotle, in the politics thus cautions against the custom in democracies of “costly but useless liturgies like equipping choruses and torch-races and all other similar services.”
it is significant that the alexandrian rabbis who were to carry out the translation of the bible into greek known as the septuagint would choose precisely the verb leitourgeo to translate the hebrew sheret every time this term, which means generically ‘to serve‘ is used in a cultic sense. ….. in both cases, the originary political meaning of the term )service done for the people) is still present. as peterson was to recall in his book on angels, ‘the church’s earthly liturgy has an original relationship to the political world’
The Septuagint is a translation of the Hebrew Bible and some related texts into Koine Greek. As the primary Greek translation of the Old Testament, it is also called the Greek Old Testament. Wikipedia
what is the question in both cases, that is to say, is a progressive and symmetrical cancellation of the difference between being and acting and between law (writing) and life, as if the indetermination of being into acting and of life into writing that the church liturgy operatively achieves functions in the monastic liturgy in an inverted sense
it is in this field of historical tension that, close to he liturgy and almost in competition with it, something like a new level of consistency of the human experience slowly begins to clear a path for itself. it is as if the form-of-life into which liturgy has been transformed sought progressively to emancipate itself from liturgy and – while unceasingly collapsing back into it and just as obstinately liberating itself from it – allows us to glimpse another, uncertain dimension of acting and being.
rev in reverse.. ness
form-of-life is, in this sense, what must unceasingly be torn away from the separation in which liturgy keeps it. the novelty of monasticism was not only the coincidence of life and norm in a liturgy, but even and above all in its greatest success, the investigation and identification of something that the syntagmas vita bel regula, …. attempt laboriously to name and that we must now attempt to define
ch 1 – the discovery of life
between 11th-12th cent’s – middle ages – religious movements
1st mention of poverty? – the claim of poverty, which is present in all the movements and which in itself is clearly not new, is only one aspect of this way or form of life, which strikes observers in a special ay… they walked barefoot, did not accept money, …..which they profess to practice in perfect joy.. … poverty is only one of the way s of reaching perfection and not perfection itself, …
shalom – completeness
it goes w/o saying that from its origins monasticism was inseparable from a certain way of life. but the problem in cenoby and hermitage was not life as such so much as the ways, norms, and techniques by means of which one succeeded in regulating it in all its aspects….. first penitential.. apostolic… angelic.. perfect…
it is just as obvious that a form of life practiced with rigor by a group of individuals will necessarily have consequences on the doctrinal level, which can bring forth… clashes and disagreements with the church hierarchy. but it is precisely on these disagreements that the attention of historians has mainly been focused, leaving in shadows the fact that perhaps for the first time, what was in question in the movements was not the rule, but the life, not the ability to profess this or that article of faith, but the ability to live in a certain way, to practice joyfully and openly a certain form of life.
….. for this reason, when confronted with this ‘novelty’ the church’s strategy consisted on the one hand in seeking to order it, regulate it, and conform is so as to divert the movements in to a new monastic order or insert them into an already existing one. on the other hand, when this appeared impossible, the church shifted the conflict from the level of life to the at of doctrine, condemning them as heretical. in both cases, what remained unthought was precisely the
originary aspiration that has led the movements to reclaim a life and not a rule, a forma vitae and not a more or less coherent system of ideas and doctrines..
or more precisely, to propose not some new exegesis of the holy text, but its pure and simple identification with life, as if they did not want to read and interpret the gospel, but only live it.
we will ask ourselves, therefore, first of all if by these terms life, form of life (forma vitae), form of living (forma vivendi) they were attempting to name something the sense and novelty ..
of which still remain to be deciphered and which, precisely for this reason, has never ceased to intimately concern us.
the semantic value of forma that the compilers of the thesaurus note for this case is imago, exemplar, exemplum, norma rerum, and as the passage from quintilian shows, it is likely that precisely the meaning of..
..had carried over to the coinage of the syntagma ..
…. in order to give you an example to imitate… 2 thess 3:9
graeber model/rev law et al
be a form of living for all, be an example…
the sense of forma here is ‘example, paradigm’ but the logic of the example is anything but simple and does not coincide with the application of a general law. forma vitae designates in this sense a way of life that, insofar as it strictly adheres to a form or model from which it cannot be separated, is thus constituted as an example.. that christ might hand down a form of life to humans by living
[note: choice is involved..or we wouldn’t be in the predicament we are.. no?]
when spiritual movements forcefully took up this syntagma starting from the 11th cent, the accent fell in equal measure on the two terms that composed it, to mean a perfect coincidence of life and form, example and follower. but it is only with the franciscans that the syntagma forma vitae assumes the character of a genuine technical term of monastic literature, and life as such becomes the question that is in every sense decisive.
in what this difference may consist and what the strategic sense of their conjunction might be (form of life and rule – regula and vita)
rule of life of brothers: live in obedience, in chastity, and w/o anything of their own…
from vita to vivere
live according to the form of the holy gospel..
had written in a few words the lord pope confirmed it for me
quid: what i must do
quod: that i must live
opposition is not only between what and that but also between doing and living..
the observation of precepts and norms and the simple fact of living according to a form…. as opponents and follower immediately understood, the form of the holy gospel is not in any way reducible to a normative code.
short code: obedience, chastity, w/o property
or how about just – love. just a and a.
indistinct use of the two terms.. life and rule… but it is, in truth, the exact opposite of a useless redundancy: the two words are put in a reciprocal tension, to name something that cannot be named otherwise.
life or rule, that is to say, life as rule.. thomas
church was to be renewed… in three ways: by the form of life, the rule, and the doctrine of christ which he would provide…..pattern, rule, and teaching.. corresponds to the three levels or modes into which the activity of the church is structured. but it is decisive that the form of life corresponds here neither with a normative system canon law, nor with a corpus of doctrine (collection of dogmas). it is a third thing between doctrine and law, between rule and dogma and it is only from the awareness of his specificity that its definition can become possible.
? making me think of .. why have we not yet..
conversatio means ‘conduct’, ‘way of life’: by juxtaposing the term with forma, in a sense more or less equivalent to forma vitae, thomas shows that he has in mind not a simple way of life, but an exemplary, qualified way of life that cannot, however, be understood as a rule… i a preceding passage, the level of life.. forent proximis ad exemplum ‘how their life and behavior might… be an example to their neighbors’ is distinct in this sense both from that of observance of a rule.. ‘how they might sincerely observe and unfailingly guard the rule the had received’
in any case the syntagma form of life seems to acquire in franciscanism a technical meaning, and it is important not to let it elude us. …. this form is not a norm imposed on life, but a living that in following the life of christ gives itself and makes itself a form.
wearing shoes depends on a dispensation from the rule in case of necessity; not wearing shoes is the form of life..
ch 2 – renouncing law
defining relationship between rule and life…. .. because only a clear comprehension will render it possible to fully evaluate both the novelty and the inadequacy of the franciscan movement – its extraordinary success and its foreseeable failure, which seems to cloud the final years of its founder’s life with such a desperate bitterness.
it will be necessary first of all to examine the entire question of poverty in this light… the altissima paupertas..highest poverty.. which founder had intended to define the life of the friars minor, is in actuality the place where the fate of franciscanism is decided, both w/in the order (conflict between conventuals/spirituals) and in its relationships with the secular clergy and the curia, which reached the point of rupture under the pontificate of john xxii. historians have reconstructed the events of this controversy… from 1279……sanctionedthe principle that the franciscans, having abdicated every right of both ownership and of use (quod proprietatem usus et rei cuiusque dominium a se abdicasse videtur), maintain however the simple de facto use over things.. … affirms the inseparability of use from ownership and attributes to the order the common ownership of the goods of which the make use..
from above – quid: what i must do….quod: that i must live110
… the principle that remains immutable and nonnegotiable fro them from beginning to end can be summarized in these terms: what is in question, for the order as for its founder, is the abdicatio omnis iuris – abdicatio of every right, that is, the possibility of a human existence beyond the law. what the franciscans never tire of confirming……is the lawfulness for the brothers of making use of goods w/o having any right to them (neither property nor of use). ….. as horse has de facto use but not property rights over the oats that it eats… so religious… simple defacto use of bread, wine, and clothes. …
from the perspective that is of interest to us here, franciscanism can be defined – and in this consists its novelty, even today unthought and in the present conditions of society totally unthinkable – as the attempt to..
realize a human life and practice absolutely outside the determinations of the law.
if we call this life that is unattainable by law – form of life – then we can say that the syntagma forma vitae expresses the most proper intention of franciscanism.
animals humanized and called brothers..
term – friars minor had properly juridical implications, …. as minors, the franciscans are, from the juridical pov, technically … pupil… subjected to the tutelage of an adult…. if all christians .. are according to common law children of the supreme pontiff, .. submitted to his authority, but as emancipated children, capable of disposing of ecclesiastical goods, the franciscans are on the contrary – like little children and sons-in-power entirely subject to the rule of the supreme pontiff….in capable of possessing anything, because property belongs solely to the father, they can only use things.
judge paul states: a madman and a minor cannot begin to won w/o the authorization of a tutor.. even though they may be in physical contact w/the object as would be the case if something were placed in the hand of a sleeping man.
in natural law all things are everyone’s…. property and all human law begin with the fall and the construction of a city on the part of cain.
apostles and friars minor could abdicate from themselves dominion and ownership over all things.. and retain to themselves at the same time the de facto use of all things.
on the ends of poverty, which defines poverty.. the free abdication of ownership for god’s sake, ..
the abdicatio iuris (with the return that it implies to the state of nature preceding the fall) and the separation of ownership from use constitute the essential apparatus that the franciscans use to technically define the peculiar condition that they call – poverty.
it is significant that the franciscan theorists obstinately aspire to configure the renunciation of the law in juridical terms.
thus hugh of digne…the friars minor – have only this to call their own not having anything of their own in transient things…..
Mary Ann tweets…
The formula for overturning the world, we didn’t seek it in books, but
in wandering. – GUY DEBORD
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/MaryAnnReilly/status/668055964239708160
nomadic ness.. as our way to us… not bound up on rights/laws/property ness..
wandering ness of us..
they have only this right, not to have any rights..
[via hugh of digne, of the friars minor]
… the pope, who states that there is no difference between ius and licentia – right and permission
olivi compares the franciscan rule to a sphere, which has christ as its center and which touches the level of earthly goods only at the – point of simple and necessary use– the state of necessity is the other tangent point, in which the franciscan form of life (the rule-life) touches on (natural not positive) law. it is between these to tangent points, the punctum usus and the tempus necessitatis, that we must situate the sphere of the minors’ rule-life that, in the words that immediately follow – is entirely reflected in a circle around christ ad his gospel as its own center and, i accordance w/ the form of a circle, it ends where it begins.. use and the state of necessity are the two extremes that define the francisca form of life.
on merit – .. a question not of right an hierarchical succession, but of imitation of the apostolic life.
imitation .. not what we’re after.. no?
the heretics say in the preaching that merit works more toward consecrating and blesing finding and loosing thatn order an doffice…
on … nothing more accomplished by good priest, and nothing less by a bad priest.. because it is confected not through thee merit of the priest, but through the word of the creator.. therefore, although the one doing the work is sometimes unclean, nevertheless the work done is always clean. the separation between life and office could not be expressed in clearer terms.
.. because the life of the friars minor is not defined by officium but solely by poverty
… but in no case does the divine office define franciscan identity (supposing that it would make sense to speak of identity for a life that refuses any property).
… highest poverty is the name that the regula bullata gives to this extraneousness to the law, but the technical term that defines teh practice in which it is actualized in teh fraciscan literature is usus (simplex usus, usus facti, usus pauper).
ch 3 – highest poverty and use
defn of poverty purely negative – voluntary abdication of ownership for lord’s sake…defn property .. the right of dominion.. by which someone is said to be lord of some thing… .. two ways property is acquired according to roman law: occupation and obligation..
natural law, hugh responds, prescribes that everyone have use of the things necessary to their conservation, but doesn’t not obligate them in any way to ownership.
… of these (ownership, possession, usufruct, use).. only use is absolutely necessary to human life and, as such, unrenounceable..
.. one of the secular masters’ objections – that in consumable things ownership cannot be separated from use
.. drinking and eating are presented as paradigms of purely factual human practice lacking any juridical implication..
to get around the purely negative character of this defn, the declaration specifies that, like any preceptum negativum, this prescribes in truth two positive acts: wanting to have nothing of one’s own as the interior act, and using the ting as not one’s own as the exterior act
on those loving riches.. not using things.. because wanting to keep them
whoa.. lost in the policy ness.. letter of law ness in all this
.. a use that it is never possible to have and an abuse that always implies a right of ownership and s moreover always one’s own indeed define the very canon of mass consumption.
manufactured consent ness
the common use of things also genealogically precedes common or divided ownership of things, which derives only from human law.
if it is true that olivi proposes in the quaestio,… an ontology of law and of signs, one nonetheless risks allowing the essential thing to escape if one does not specify the modality in which this ontology is articulated.
in the terms of medieval philosophy, this means that the realities in question are not situated on the level of essence or of the quid est, but only in that of existence or of the quod est; they are thus, as heidegger will write many centuries later, purely existential and not essential.
this means that in the very moment in which one admits a real efficacy to right and signs they are demoted from the level of essences and made to hold as pure effectualities that depend solely on a command of the human or divine will.
olivi writes, you will fid that signification does not add to the real essence of the thing that is used as a sign anything other than the mental intention of those who have instituted it and accepted its validity and of those who accept it in action in order to signify and of those who hear it or receive it as a sign…. and the command produced by the intention of the one who signifies.
the sphere of human practice, with its rights and its signs, is real and efficacious, but it produces nothing essential, nor does it generate any new essence beyond its own effects. … form of life is the purely existential reality that must be liberated from the signature of law and office or duty.
… necessary .. not to forget that this doctrine was elaborated within a defensive strategy against attacks ..
so much of life.. played in defense mode.. rev in reverse.. ness
one can say that from this pov, francis was more prescient than his successors, in that he refused to articulate his vivere sine proprio in a juridical conceptuality and left it completely indeterminate. but also true .. ovitas vitae could be tolerated in small group……one can say … arguments of franciscan theorists are over/under valuation of law. on one hand, use its conceptuality and never call into question its validity or foundations, on the other, they think they can secure with juridical arguments the possibility, through abdicating the law, of pursuing an existence outside the law.
thinking of jordan‘s – tinkering with policy is a distraction. even though perhaps.. not deep enough still in his take.
laying bare the nature of ownership, which is thus revealed to have a reality that is only psychological (intention to possess the thing as one’s own) and procedural (power to claim in court).
savigny could define possession as the condition of fact, corresponding to property as the condition of law. the factum of possession forms a system, in this sense, with the right of ownership.
sounds like he’s been saying.. in last couple pages.. that failure in the movement was in failure to define the actions – of form of life..
if so.. is that definable.. (i don’t think so)
and if so.. wouldn’t that then kill it.. (i think so)
(previous to this sounds like journal/diary clip) – in reality it is a matter of a restoration of the rules to their originary nature as transcription of the monks’ coversatio or way of life…
sounds like – perhaps self-talk as data.. could be the undefinition we’re seeking..?
the franciscan form of life is, in this sense, the end of all lives, the final modus, after which the manifold historical dispensation of modi vivendi is no longer possible. the ‘highest poverty,’ with its use of things, is the form-of-life that begins when all the west’s forms of life have reached their historical consummation.
143 – 144
what was lacking in the franciscan doctrine of use is precisely the connection with the ida of form of life that olivi’s text seems to implicitly demand. it is as if the … which… was to define the franciscan form of life as a perfect life…. lost its centrality once it was linked to the concept of usus facti and ended up being characterized only negatively with respect to the law. certainly, … franciscan life could e affirmed unreservedly as that existence which is situated outside the law, which must abdicate the law in order to exist – and this is certainly the legacy that modernity has shown itself to be incapable of facing and that our time does not seem to be at all in a position to think. but what is life outside the law, if it is defined as that form of life which makes use of things w/o every appropriating them? and wha tis use, if one ceases to define it solely negatively w/respect to ownership?
it is the problem of the essential connection between use and form of life that is becoming undeferrable at this point. how can use – that is, a relation to the world insofar as it is inappropriable – be translated into an ethos and a form of life? and what ontology and which ethics would correspond to a life that, in use, is constituted as inseparable from its form? the attempt to respond to these questions will necessarily demand a confrontation with the operative ontological paradigm into whose mold liturgy, by means of a secular process, has ended up forcing the ethics and politics of the wet. use and form of life are the two apparatuses through which the franciscans tried, certainly in an insufficient way, to break this mold and confront that paradigm. but it is clear that only by taking up the confrontation again from a new perspective will we perhaps be able to decide whether and to what extent that which appears in olivi as the extreme form of life of the christian west has any meaning for it – or whether, on the contrary, the planetary dominion of he paradigm of operativity demands that the decisive confrontation be shifted to another terrain.
yes. another terrain. one sans irrelevant s.. for (blank)’s sake..
[ontology: the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.]
circling back to preface
object of this study is the attempt… to construct a form-of=life… linked so closely to its form that it proves to be inseparable from it.
rather.. it is first of all a matter of uderstanding the dialectic… between two terms rule and life. this dialectic is indeed so dense and complex that, in the eyes of modern scholars, it seems to resolve itself at times into a perfect identity: vita vel regula – life or rule, …. here it is preferable, however, to leave to the vel and the et all their semantic ambiguity, in order instead to look at the monastery as a field of forces run through by two intensities that are opposed and, at the same time, intertwined.
are they intertwined? by nature? or by human? is rule a given.?
in one case as in the other, what remained untouched was perhaps the most precious legacy of franciscanism, to which the west must return ever anew to contend with it as its undeferrable task: how to think a form of life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. that is to say again: to think life as that which is never given as property but only as a common use.
such a task will demand the elaboration of a theory of use – which western philosophy lacks even the most elementary principles – and, … a critique of the operative and governmental ontology that continues, under various disguises, to determine the destiny of the human species. this task remains reserved for the final volume of homo sacer.
so – highest poverty (to me) is still – absence of all shalom.. completeness. and that completeness perhaps.. comes from.. can come from ..2 needs (a&a) .. deep enough to be the essence of each soul.
we can’t not.