the highest poverty
read the book by Giorgio Agamben [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giorgio_Agamben]
In The Coming Community, published in 1990 and translated by longtime admirer Michael Hardt in 1993, Agamben describes the social and political manifestation of his philosophical thought. Employing diverse short essays he describes the nature of “whatever singularity” as that which has an “inessential commonality, a solidarity that in no way concerns an essence”. It is important to note his understanding of “whatever” not as being indifference but based on the Latin “quodlibet ens” translated as “being such that it always matters”
Nathan on Ben here:
The presiding unAbbot was Ben Vickers, 27 years old, with patches of gray on either side of his well-trimmed hair and a hooded black coat worn over his banded-collar black shirt. While also more or less retaining his post as “curator of digital” for London’s Serpentine Galleries, Vickers was the unMonastery’s chief theorist and coordinator; the others generally praised his ability to digest and summarize their various points of view, and to document them on the online platforms they use to communicate. He blasted George Michael while setting up breakfast and found a certain glee in the prospect of failure—a turn of mind probably honed during his days in doomed anarchist squats. But documentation can trump even failure; others can study the attempt, tweak it and try again.
r: ben – on how unmonastery ites are so un bounded ish.. and this fundamental thing is rules. in the monasteries, it was guilt and in hierarchical iterations of the monasteries; violence.
i don’t want to use either.. so i recommend: experimentations. ie: we haven’t tried this before, lets see what happens if we ie: wake at 5am. then share analysis….also on monasticism, read the agamben’s the highest poverty (not available for rec on overdrive) (earlier said read it because we’re wasting time on monasticism) .. the power of the rule; rules are obeyed in the eyes of god, upon the self. the self in this way is not accountable to the group, any more than they want to participate and judge this as a necessary lubricant for that participation..
also says.. everyone should read highest poverty and that he would buy a copy for whoever
to the book..
by Giorgio Agamben
Giorgio Agamben (Italian: [aˈɡambɛn]; born 22 April 1942) is an Italian philosopher best known for his work investigating the concepts of the state of exception,form-of-life (borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein) and homo sacer. The concept of biopolitics (borrowed from Michel Foucault) informs many of his writings.
the highest poverty – published 2011 – translated to english 2013
notes/quotes (from first read 2013 ish? and reread 2021):
object of this study is the attempt.. by means of an investigation of the exemplary case of monasticism.. to construct a form of life.. that tis to say.. a life that is linked so closely to its form that it proves to be inseparable from it..
it is from this perspective that the study is confronted first of all w the problem of the relationship between rule and life.. which defines the apparatus thru which the monks attempted to realize their ideal of a communal form of life.. what is at stake is not the task of investigating the imposing mass of punctilious precepts and ascetic techniques..liturgies.. punishments.. thru which cenoby constituted itself as a ‘regular life’ in order to achieve salvation.. rather.. it is first of all a mater of understanding the dialectic that thus comes to be established between the two terms rule and life.. so dense and complex that in eyes of modern scholars.. seems to resolve itself at times into a perfect identity.. vita vel regula (life or rule)
the two intensities that are opposed and at the same time intertwined.. in their reciprocal tension something new and unheard of.. that is.. form of life.. has persistently approached its very realization and has just as persistently missed it
the great novelty of monasticism is not the confusion of life and norm.. rather.. it is the identification of a level of consistency that unthought/unthinkable.. in which both rule and life lose their familiar meaning in order to point in the direction of a third thing. our task is precisely to bring this third thing to light.
(on ben asking what third way is p 35 of uncode) – i’d say – third thing if you like – as eudaimonia… and the dance via attachment as eudaimoniative surplus.. so how to create/uncover an operating system that can facilitate that.. mechanism simple enougn – grounding/facilitating the chaos of 7 billion set free to eudaimonia – 100%/singularity ness/third way ness.
Is duty oppression?
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/ntnsndr/status/1422664664530317315
back to book:
in course of this study.. what has appeared to present an obstacle to he emergence and comprehension of this third thing is not so much the insistence on apparatuses that can appear to be juridical .. like the vow and the profession.. rather.. it is a phenom absolutely central in the history of the church and opaque for modern people: the liturgy.. the great temptation of the monks was not that which painting of the quattrocento have fixed in the seminude female figure and in the shapeless monsters that assail anthony in his heritage, but the will to construct their life as a total and unceasing liturgy or divine office.
liturgy – ritual – a religious or solemn ceremony consisting of a series of actions performed according to a prescribed order.
hence.. this study.. which proposed initially to define form-of-life by means of the analysis of monasticism.. has had to contend w the unforeseen and .. at least in appearance, misleading and extraneous task of an archeology of duty (ufficio).. (the results published in opus dei: an archeology of duty)
yeah.. killer/oppression nathan.. obligation ness
if the comprehension of the monastic form of life could be achieved only by means of a continuous opposition to he liturgical paradigm.. what is perhaps the crucial test of the study could only be found, however, in the analysis of the spiritual movements of the 12-13th centuries.. which culminate in franciscanism.. insofar as they situate their central experience no longer on the level of doctrine and law.. but on level of life.. they appear from this perspective as a the moment that was in every respect decisive in the history of monasticism.. in which strength/successes and weakness/failings.. reached greatest tension
book closes.. therefore.. with an interp of he message of francis and of the franciscan theory of poverty and use..
in one case as in the other, what remained untouched was perhaps the most precious legacy of franciscanism, to which the west must return ever anew to contend with it as its undeferrable task: how to think a form-of-life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. that is to say again: to think life as that which is never given as property but only as a common use.
huge.. not as property.. we need to let go of any form of m\a\p
such a task will demand the elaboration of a theory of use – of which western philosophy lacks even the most elementary principles – and, moving forward from that, a critique of the operative and governmental ontology that continues, under various disguises, to determine the destiny of the human species.
ie: a nother way
ch 1 – birth of the rule
4th and 5th centuries of the christian era witnessed the birth of a peculiar literature that.. at least at first glance, does not seem to have had precedents in the classical world: *monastic rules.. the set of texts.. so diverse.. could not be greater.. above all .. diverse in content.. ranges form question s regarding interp of scripture or spiritual edification of monks to the dry or meticulous enunciation of precepts and prohibitions..
these are not, at least at first glance, juridical works, even though they claim to regulate, often in fine detail and thru precise sanctions.. the life of a *group of individuals..
there’s part of our biggest problem.. thinking we need to engineer the *grouping of individuals.. whenever we engineer that grouping.. (rather than letting the dance dance).. we’re in sea world/tragedy of the non common.. which just perpetuates the idea that we can’t exist w/o rules/liturgy/structure
imagine if we just focused on listening to the itch-in-8b-souls.. first thing.. everyday.. and used that data to augment our interconnectedness.. (diff groupings than we’ve yet imagined/tried) .. we might just get to a more antifragile, healthy, thriving world.. the ecosystem we keep longing for.. what the world needs most is the energy of 8b alive people
they are not historical narratives, even though at times they seem to simply transcribe the way of life and habits of the members of a community.. although ultimate goal is doubtless the salvation of the soul.. the rules do not belong to ecclesiastical lit or practice.. from which they distance themselves.. they are not, finally, hypomneumata or ethical exercises, like those that michel foucault has analyzed from the late classical world. and yet their central preoccupation is precisely that of governing the life and customs of men, both singularly and collectively.
we need to let go of any form of m\a\p
parody in 1534.. ..gargantua used to say, the greatest waste of time he knew of was to count the hours – what good comes of that? (on no clocks in monasteries) and the greatest folly in the world was to govern oneself by the ring of a bell and not at the dictation of good sense and understanding.
back to the need to listen to itch-in-8b-souls.. first thing everyday.. and trust that
all their life was laid out not by laws, statutes, or rules but according to their will and free choice… their rule was only this clause: do what you will
well.. wasn’t really.. we haven’t yet tried that legit.. we can’t seem to let go enough (and create a rat park legit open enough) to see that.. so we just keep seeing this horrid ness that makes us scream for more rules
2\ if we create a way to ground the chaos of 8b free people
it has been said that theleme was the antimonastery.. yet.. it is not simply a matter of an inversion of order into disorder and of rule into anomia..even if contracted into only one sentence, a rule exists and has an author.. thus gargantua has established it. and in the end that it intends is, *despite the point by point dismissal of every obligation and the unconditional liberty of each, perfectly homogenous with that of the monastic rule: cenoby – the common life, the perfection of a common life in all and for all, live harmoniously in a house pleasantly …
this is like david on creative refusal.. it’s a distraction/cancer from the itch-in-the-soul.. it gets us playing defense/response/refusal.. gets us trying to ‘un’ something.. rather than living/being/fittingness
by this freedom they were all moved by laudable emulation to do what they saw a single one liked.. if some man/woman said: ‘let’s drink’ they all drank; if one said: ‘let’s go play in the fields’.. they all went..
we don’t need more structure.. we need to change up with whom we gather.. ie: imagine if we
the rabelaisian parody, though comical in appearance, is thus so serious that one can compare the episode of theleme to the franciscan foundation of a new type of order: the common life, by identifying itself with the rule without remainder, abolishes and cancels it.
it can appear surprising that the monastic idea, born as an individual and solitary flight from the world, should have given origin to a model of total communitarian life.
the theme of the common life.. via acts… were together and had all things in common… were of one heart and one soul, and no one claimed private ownership .. but everything they owned was held in common act 4:32… augustine’s rule defines as the first goal of the monastic life: that you dwell in unity in the house and that you have but one soul..
the idea of a common life seems to have an obvious political meaning. in the politics, aristotle defines the city as a perfect community – koinonia teleios.. and makes use of the term syzen to live together.. to define the political nature of humans.. *they desire to live together. yet he never speaks of a koinos bios. the polis is certainly born with view toward living, but its reason for existing is living well….. the monastery, like the polis, is a community that intends to realize the perfection of the cenobial life… cassian therefore distinguishes the monastery from cenoby, because a monastery is the name of the residence and does not imply more than the place where the monks live. house of cenobites points to the character and the way of life of the profession. the residence of a simple monk can be called a monastery. but a place cannot be termed a house of cenobites unless one means a community of many people living together. cenoby does not name only a place but first of all a form of life.
*only when legit free.. sans rules et al.. otherwise.. have to engineer that desire
the sense of this articulation.. which, after having distinguished the cenobites ‘living in common’ from the anchorites ‘live alone in wilderness’, opposes to these, as a ‘detestable and filthy’ type, the sarabaites which becomes canonical.. becomes clear, however, only if one understand that what is in question is not the opposition between solitude and common life, so much as the (so to speak) ‘political’ opposition between order and disorder, governance and anarchy stability and nomadism..
on the 3rd type (i think meaning detestable sarabaites).. defined by fact they live ‘together by twos or threes, not many more, and live according to their own will and independently.. and ‘do not put up w being governed by the care and power of the abbot.. and have as their law the willfulness of their own desires.. and the live w/o having been tested.. by any rule’
on cenobites (monks praying tother devoutly) and anchorites (austere/strict solitary monk).. are the inferior images of the sarabaites, who walk in the opposite directions turning their backs to each other and the itinerants, who gulp down food/drink w/o restraint.. once the anchoritic exception is left to one side.. the problem of monasticism will always be more that of *constructing and affirming itself as an ordered and well governed community..
*as to what i just wrote about.. on the (assumed/cancerous) need to engineer us into order.. because we never let go enough for the actual dance to dance.. not because we actually/humanely needed that order/governing
on habitus ness becoming virtue.. ‘the virtue that distinguished the brothers in habitation and obedience’.. in monastic life ‘habitus’ originally signified ‘a way of being/acting’.. among stoics became synonymous w virtue.. ‘by habit we mean astable and absolute constitution of mind or body‘.. seems more and more to designate the way of dressing.. all the more so in that habitus was closely associated w dress, which was in some way a necessary part of the ‘way to conduct oneself‘..
from way community ought to be – monastery sans solitary monk.. to habitus.. way person ought to conduct.. oi
explaining significance of parts of monks’ clothing
to inhabit together thus meant for the monks to share, not simply a place or a style of dress.. but first of all a habitus.. the monk is in this sense a man who lives in the mode of ‘inhabiting’ according to a rule and a form of life.. it is certain, nevertheless.. that cenoby reps the attempt to make habit and form of life coincide in an absolute and total habitus.. in which it would not be possible to distinguish between dress and way of life..
magis esse quam videri (to be rather than to appear) ness.. but clothes/habitus to life.. to dress/show-orderly-conduct (appear).. rather than to be..
‘clothes make the man’.. cleric distinguished by his dress from other members of the community.. contrary to ecclesiastical tradition.. bishops must be distinguished from people ‘not by clothing, but by doctrine; not by habit, but by way of life
so clothes is to doctrine.. as habit is to following that doctrine (way of life)
went from clothing and way of life interconnected to distinction between clerical habit and secular habit
genesis linked very origin of clothing to fall.. clothes a symbol of sin.. but it is only in monasticism that one witnesses a total moralization of every single element of dress.. anal of ‘garments and equipment of priests’..
ie: sandals/belt/stole/tunic as reps/links to rules/chains/duty/obedience/shame.. zinn obedience law et al
foucault has shown that at the threshold of the industrial revolution, the disciplinary apparatuses (schools, barracks, colleges, the first real factories) had begun to divide periods of time into successive or parallel segments .. t already from the end of the 17th cent, in order then to obtain a more efficient complex result through the combination of the individual chronological series…. the rigor of this scansion not only had no precedents in the classical world, but in its strict absoluteness it has perhaps never been equaled in any institution of modernity, not even the factory of taylor.. in the oriental tradition .. horologium (clock) is significantly the name that designates the book that contained the order of the canonical offices according to the hours of day/night.. in its ordinary form.. it goes back to palistinian and syriac monastic ascesis 7-8th cent.. the offices of prayer/psalmody were ordered as a ‘clock’ that marked the rhythm of the prayers .. articulating life according to hours..t
supposed to’s of school/work et al.. killing us
6th cent cassiodorus informs his monks ‘i have not allowed you to be ignorant in any way of the measurement of time that was invented for the great sue of the human race..’
norton productivity law et al
it is certain that the whole life of the monk is modeled according to an implacable and incessant temporal articulation.. measuring the hours..
the cenobite is, in this sense, first of all a total hourly scansion of existence, in which every moment has it corresponding office or duty,.. t either of prayer and reading or manual labor.. certainly the early church had already elaborated a liturgy of hours..
huge oi.. to duty .. obligation.. ness..
unceasing prayer.. on the clock.. cassian.. whole purpose of monk .. dedicated to prayer
the spiritualization of the work of the hands.. seen as a significant precursor of the protestant ascesis of labor.. of which capitalism, according to max weber.. reps the secularization.. christian liturgy.. defined as a ‘sanctification of time‘.. cenobitic project can on the contrary be defined more precisely as a sanctification of life by means of time..t
supposed to’s of school/work .. et al
hybridization between manual labor and prayer.. between life and time.. is meditatio.. no meditation in modern sense.. but.. recitation by memory of scripture..meditation is a fundamental duty.. like fasting.. meditation is defined as ‘a rich store of memorized texts’..
memory went beyond silent reading.. meditatio is the continuation of this practice w/o any further need for lectio.. by this point the text is available in the memory for an uninterrupted and solitary recitation.. which can thus accompany and temporally *articulate form the inside the entire day of the monk and become inseparable from his every gesture and his every activity.. ‘meditate on the word s and keep silent.. ‘
ladder by which monks are lifted from earth to heaven: 1\ reading – puts whole food in mouth 2\ meditation – chews and breaks it up 3\ prayer – extracts its flavor 4\ contemplation – the sweetness which gladdens and refreshes..
the overcoming of sloth (ie: falling asleep while reading) is presented as a stage in which nature itself appears as a book and the life of the monk as a condition of absolute and uninterrupted legibility.. the perfect life coincides w the legibility of the world, sins w the impossibility of reading (with its becoming illegible)
2 – rule and law
the difficulty the law has in including the monks’ status vitae in it sown circle of application.. the discomfort/embarrassment of the jurists betrays a difficulty that concerns the peculiarity of the monastic life in its vocation to confuse itself w the rule
every other page flips law/life as heading.. on purpose?
‘the lord grant’ reads the conclusion of the rule of augustine ‘that you observe all these things w joy.. not as slaves under the law but as thse who have been set free by grace’
to a monk who asked him how he should behave w disciples.. palamon, master of pachomius responds: ‘be their example, not their legislator’
in same sense, ,mar abraham, upon laying out the rule of his monastery, recalls that we must not consider ourselves ‘legislators, neither for ourselves nor for others’
ie: those getting excited about blockchain doing law..
Awesome paper on a #blockchain judicial system. #bitcoin https://t.co/PSSnunXTcq
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/dtapscott/status/667110255587926016
Rather than talking about crypto: We should consider discussing what causes EU citizens to commit heinous murders and then to suicide.
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/ioerror/status/666775010330222592
the ambiguity is evident in the pachomian praecepta atque iudicia, which begins with eh resolutely antilegalistic statement – love is the fulfillment of the law – plenitudo legis caritas, only to enunciate immediately afterward a series of matters of an exclusively penal character.. bacht p 255
penal system of monks – excommunication.. removed from people.. gatherings to eat.. blessings on food. … and if remains arrogant.. by 9th hr of 3rd day… confined/whipped to point of death.. and if the abbot so please, expelled from the monastery.
lots of crazy stuff in here
seems to suggest that the punishment of the monks had an essentially moral and amendatory meaning.. comparable to therapy prescribed by a dr
the counterpart of this medical metaphor is the inscription of the obligation of obedience.. not w/in the prospect of a legal system.. but w/in the more neutral one of the rules of an arts (art) or technique.. ‘even in the case of the arts’ ..dedicated to ‘authority and obedience’.. ‘the individual ought not be permitted to follow the one he is skilled in or the one he wishes to learn, but that for which he may be judged suited.. ‘.. t
to deem of no account that which is at one’s immediate disposal is the sign of a fickle mind and an unstable will..
so saying need to stick to it.. and not follow whimsy.. but.. the it is me.. ness
it could not be more clearly said that the precepts that the monk must observe are to be assimilated to the rules of an art rather than to a legal apparatus.
in this sense, the monastery is perhaps the first place in which life itself – and not only the ascetic techniques that form and regulate it – was presented as an art. this analogy must not be understood, however, in the sense of an aestheticization of existence, but rather i the sense that michel foucault seemed to have in mind in his last writings, namely a definition of life itself in relation to a never-ending practice.
eudaimonian art\ists. all of us. each one.
the absence of all shalom. – bryant myers
the problem.. which humbert initially lays out in the traditional form of a quaestio is ‘if everything that is contained int eh rule is in praecepto (obligatory).. the problem is thus one of the relation between regula and praeceptum..
the intention of the saint was to make obligatory the observance of 3 essential precepts: obedience, chastity, humility.. like the commandment of reciprocal love..
huge red flags
the one who pronounces the vow, more than being obligated or condemns to execution. becomes at least in the extreme case of devotio of the consul, a homo sacer.. his life swell in threshold between life/death and can be killed by anyone w impunity.. greatest possible confusion reigns in terminological multiplicity of vocab.. thru inconsistency of meaning.. conduct, prayer, declaration, oath, desire.. promise, obligation, mode of life..
homo sacer: Homo sacer is a figure of Roman law: a person who is banned and may be killed by anybody, but may not be sacrificed in a religious ritual.
as to obedience ‘its function is first of all ascetic; it is a matter of reproducing the model that christ was.. it is neither the object of religious obligation, nor the consequence of a determinate juridical situation’ .. one virtue among others..
admission to the status of monk depends on the tenacity of the novice ant his capacity to observe the rule of obedience.. and not on the pronunciation of a vow..
but if you refuse to obey me in anything at all
now the that you are a monk.. no longer just obey god but obey me (mentor monk)
what is clearly expressed here is the tendency to consider the monk’s life as an uninterrupted office and liturgy, which we have already mentioned and to which we will have occasion to return
furthermore, the debates that we have analyzed over the ‘legal’ or ‘advisory’ character of the rules, which seem to approach the terms of our problem, become intelligible only if one does not forget that they are superimposed over the theological problem of the relation between the two .. mosaic law and new testament
christian life no longer ‘under the law’.. and cannot in any case be conceived in juridical terms.. lives in freedom of the spirit.. ‘law of faith’.. in the law there is the letter (for transgression – law observed).. in the gospel.. grace (for justification – promised consummated).. love is fulfillment of the law.. the rule, whose model is the gospel, cannot therefore have the form of law..
rule but not law.. ? .. what rule?
what the rule has in view.. *cannot have a legal nature
*matters little if still oppressive/structural violence .. aka: not love/grace
ugh to all the policy/promises/punishments/obligation/verbiages/professions.. no?
ch 3 – flight from the world and constitution
53’s cloistered/sheltered.. flight from world
‘this formula’ he writes ‘is the expression of a juridical negotiation thru which a multiplicity is united for a common cloistered (sheltered) life’
on herwegen.. distinguishing it from mastic profession in strict sense.. does not notice that the pactum constitutes perhaps the first and only ie of a social contract in which human beings in a group subject themselves unconditionally to the authority of a dominus.. attributing to him the power to direct the life of the community.. hobbes/convenient .. rousseau’s/social-contract.. in which authority of the sovereign knows no limits.. to the monks’ obligation of subjections there corresponds to the obligation to govern w justice on part of the abbot.. documents/constitutions of the cloistered community
in reality what is decisive here is not so much the problem of the more/less juridical nature of the rules.. but more generally that of the peculiar relation between life and norm that comes to be established in the rule.. what is in question is not what in the rule is precepts and what is advice, nor the degree of obligations.. but rather a new way of conceiving the relation between life/law..
rule and law/life headings swapping significance
the one who promises does not obligate himself.. as happens in the law.. to the fulfillment of the individual acts expected in the rule.. but puts into question his way of living.. hence in certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule..
the object of the promise is here no longer a legal text to observeor a certain action of a series of determinate behaviors.. but the subject’s very forma vivendi..
still be watched/expected.. so still cancer
the vow.. inso far as it’ is nothing other than the obligation, by which someone is bound spontaneously to god’ *does not obligate one, like the law, simply to fulfill determinate acts and keep away from others.. but produces in the will a ‘permanent and as it were, habitual bond’..
*actually it does.. just in more subtle ways.. ie: structural/spiritual violence et al
in distinction from the pagan devotio, in which the devotus consigned to the gods his body and his bio life.. the christian vow is .. so to speak.. objectively vowed and has no other content than the production of a habitus in the will.. whose ultimate result will be a certain form of common life.. (or from the liturgical perspective, the realization of a certain officium or a certain religio).. in our archeology of duty.. we showed that religio is the name that theologians give to that singular relation between norm and life.. which configure a sot of juridical duty in the form of a virtue or a habitus
oi.. same song – duty.. obligation.. as life ness.. all oppression (nathan)
wittgenstein: ‘not possible to follow a rule privately.. because referring to a rule necessarily implies a community and a set of habits.. to follow a rule, make a report, given an order, play a game of chess.. are customs (usages, institutions) and following rule is a practice.. and to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule.. and that’s why it’s not possible to follow rule privately’..
what is in question in the life of cenoby.. is thus a transformation of the very canon of human practice.. which has been so determinate for ethics/politics of western society.. that perhaps *still today we cannot fully grasp its nature and implications
*aka: when deciding/inviting who’s in a space.. (rather than letting the itch-in-8b-souls dance the dance).. we are all in sea world.. ongoingly.. where we assume rules/duty/obligation.. all the red flags
bleeds into freeman ness (if can get back to itch in 8b souls.. can let go of rules/duties/structure/institutions..)
what is in question in the monastic rules is thus a transformation that seems to bear on the very way in which human action is conceived.. so that one shifts form the level of practice/action to that of form of life and living.. this dis location of ethics and politics form the sphere of action to that of form of life reps the most demanding legacy of monasticism.. which modernity has failed to recognize.. how should one understand this figure of a living/life that cannot be brought back to law/morals/precept/advice/labor/contemplation.. and that nonetheless *appears explicitly as the canon of a perfect community?
ll. liturgy and rule
ch1 – regula vitae
but if we must follow regularity, varro writes, either we must observe that regularity which is present in ordinary usage, or we must observe also that which is not found there. if we must follow that which is present, there is no need of rules, because when we follow usage, regularity attends us..
a case for whimsy?
which seems at this point silly that i’m seeking a case from this writing. this writing is bound up in rules of rules.. so opposite to begin with. debating whether a word is said a certain way.. assuming that the sayer carries that much weight. i don’t know.
[yeah .. all that.. agreeing with first reading comments]
ie: is this a matter of a subjective genitive .. or an objective genitive…it is a subjective genitive, then, even if in a special sense.. rule must be produced out of law
oh my .. the rules ness..
faith to furnish regula..
rule/regula from faith.. (bleeding into).. regula often refer to interpretation of scripture..
so.. movement goes in both direction.. rule made life and life made rule..
oi.. end of even just acknowledging some non hierarchical listening
starting w wittgenstien.. philosophers of law sought to define peculiar type of norms.. which don’t describe preexisting state of things.. but themselves bring int begin action/state of things.. ie: chess pieces don’t exist before the game.. but are constituted by the rules of the game.. (the paw is the sum of the rules for its move).. obvious that execution of rule of this type.. becomes extremely problematic.. but can on e say in this sense that the monk.. like the pawn in chess, is defined by the sum of prescriptions according to which he lives.. could one not rather say w greater truth exactly the opposite that it is the monk’s form of life that creates this rules..?.. perhaps both are true.. on the condition we specify that rules/life enter into zone of indifference.. no longer possibility of distinguishing them.. allow a 3rd thing to appear.. franciscans define w precision.. ‘use’..
oi.. what computers can’t do.. can’t compare.. alive things to chess et al.. let go
in reality.. as wittgenstein seems to suggest.. the very idea of a constitutive rule implies that the common representation according to which th problem of the rule would consist simply in the application of a general principe to an individual case.. that is.. according to the kantian model of determinate judgment, in a merely logical operation.. is neutralized.. the cenobit project, by shifting the ethical problem from the level of relation between norm/action to that of form of life.. seems to call into question the very dichotomy of rule and life.. universal and particular, necessity an liberty, thru which we are used to comprehending ethics..
ch 2 – orality and writing
nature of rules starting from textual structure.. referring to a *gathering.. ‘we gathered together’.. whose participants, intending to ‘live according to piety‘.. propose getting to know what can guide them toward salvations.. a matter of veritable staging proven by fact that text proceeds to evoke an indeterminate but opportune place/time, in which it must be supposed that they pronounced (and later put into writing) the questions/answer that make up the rule (‘the present is most opportune time and **this place provides quiet and complete freedom from external disturbance‘)
all the red flags.. we have no idea what legit free people are like..
rule put into writing while the conversation was unfolding.. thru expert staging of orality.. the text refers to its own writing.. ‘putting in writing and setting in order a rule that might be kept in the monastery for the progress of the brothers..’ once the goal of the session is explicitly that of writing down th rule.. possibility opened .. that allows us to read the term regula not only in sense of ‘way of life’.. but also in that of a ‘written text’.. passage from orality to wring has already taken place.. thus a matter not so much of writing the rule but of reading it ‘when gather.. at the very first read rule..’ .. rule is already written text that therefore can and must be read.. above all to the convert who asks to enter in to the monastery (‘it seemed appropriate .. that when someone wants to be converted from the world to he monastery.. the rule be read to him when he enters’).. w benedictine rule we arrive at the *end of the tension between orality and writing
oi oi oi.. oh my.. convo to rule/death to text/death to read/poison to new converts.. (aka: baby whales.. 5 yr olds.. not yet scrambleds).. *rather.. beginning of the death of us.. language as control/enclosure/cancer.. shaw communication law.. words/text/reading kill it/us
75: mid.. what is in question here
what is in question here seems to be the constitution of *the special status of the text of the rule.. the rule, that is to say, stages something that is not exhausted in either of these dimensions (written and oral), but finds its truth precisely and solely in the tension that it installs between them. neither written word nor living voice, the rule constantly moves between these polarities, in search of an ideal of the perfect common life that is precisely meant to define.
meant to define..? what if *that is what is keeping us from us.. killing us… language as control/enclosure
‘realize that i am speaking to you.. and that thru my words god is instructing you’.. ‘hear me speaking.. what is being said to you not by my mouth but by god’..
key to enigma that permits us to define proper basis and nature of the rule: the weekly reader – a reading that is taken up again every day from the point where it was interrupted: ‘every day the reader reads the rule, marking the place to which he reads day after day, so that it is read in daily sequence yet in its entirety.. ‘
oi.. key is already in each heart not weekly/compulsory text
by reading the rule that prescribes to him the reading of the rule, the reader performatively executes the rule ipso facto. his lectio realizes, that is to say, the exemplary instance of an enunciation of the rule that coincides with its execution of an observance that is rendered indiscernible from the command that it obeys.. the dialectic between orality and writing is *perfected here: there is a written text but in reality it only lives through the reading that is made of it.
the rule presupposes a precedence of writing, but what is at stake is a writing that is inert in itself, which must be ‘put into use’ by its reading.
this is confirmed some pages later, where it recommends that the traveling monk do the reading and, if he cannot, have recourse to meditatio, to recitation from memory, ‘in order to give the rule its due each day‘…. lectio and meditatio belong constitutively to the rule and define its status.
ch 3 – the rule as a liturgical text
if we turn now to the problem of the nature of monastic rules, it is possible then to advance the hypothesis that the rule of the master, by making the rule the object of a lectio continua, in reality decisively affirms its liturgical status.
life of the monk has been transformed into an office and the very harshness of the prescriptions concerning prayer and reading articulate just as meticulously every other aspect of life in cenoby
inspectors of inspectors et al
while the unworthy priest remains in any case a priest and the sacramental acts he carries out do not lose their validity, an unworthy monk is simply not a monk.
from this perspective, the protestant reformation can be seen legitimately as the implacable claim, promoted by Luther (an augustinian monk) of the monastic liturgy against the church liturgy.
the greek term leitourgia derives from laos (people) and ergon (work) and means – public tribute, service for the people. the term belongs originally to the political lexicon and designates the services that well to do citizens owe to the polis (organizing public games, arming a trireme, staging a chorus for the city’s festivals). aristotle, in the politics thus cautions against the custom in democracies of “costly but useless liturgies like equipping choruses and torch-races and all other similar services.”
it is significant that the alexandrian rabbis who were to carry out the translation of the bible into greek known as the septuagint would choose precisely the verb leitourgeo to translate the hebrew sheret every time this term, which means generically ‘to serve‘ is used in a cultic sense. ….. in both cases, the originary political meaning of the term )service done for the people) is still present. as peterson was to recall in his book on angels, ‘the church’s earthly liturgy has an original relationship to the political world’
The Septuagint is a translation of the Hebrew Bible and some related texts into Koine Greek. As the primary Greek translation of the Old Testament, it is also called the Greek Old Testament. Wikipedia
what is the question in both cases, that is to say, is a progressive and symmetrical cancellation of the difference between being and acting and between law (writing) and life, as if the indetermination of being into acting and of life into writing that the church liturgy operatively achieves functions in the monastic liturgy in an inverted sense
what we need to get back/to is fittingness
it is in this field of historical tension that, close to he liturgy and almost in competition with it, something like a new level of consistency of the human experience slowly begins to clear a path for itself.it is as if the form-of-life into which liturgy has been transformed sought progressively to emancipate itself from liturgy and – while unceasingly collapsing back into it and just as obstinately liberating itself from it – allows us to glimpse another, uncertain dimension of acting and being.
form-of-life is, in this sense, what must unceasingly be torn away from the separation in which liturgy keeps it. the novelty of monasticism was not only the coincidence of life and norm in a liturgy, but even and above all in its greatest success, the investigation and identification of something that the syntagmas vita bel regula, …. attempt laboriously to name and that we must now attempt to define
why..? why must we define things? killing us..
ch 1 – the discovery of life
between 11th-12th cent’s – middle ages – religious movements
followers define selves as: humiliati; poor in christ; good men;minor brothers; idiots.. in any case.. what they state and claim does not actually concern theological or dogmatic questions, article of faith or problem of scriptural interp
dawn of everything.. as diff questions.. so diff possibilities..
1st mention of poverty? – the claim of poverty, which is present in all the movements and which in itself is clearly not new, is only one aspect of this way or form of life, which strikes observers in a special way… they walked barefoot, did not accept money, carried no wallet/shoes/tunic…..which they profess to practice in perfect joy.. … poverty is only one of the ways of reaching perfection and not perfection itself, …
shalom – completeness
it goes w/o saying that from its origins monasticism was inseparable from a certain way of life. but the problem in cenoby and hermitage was not life as such so much as the ways, norms, and techniques by means of which one succeeded in regulating it in all its aspects….. first penitential.. apostolic… angelic.. perfect…
it is just as obvious that a form of life practiced with rigor by a group of individuals will necessarily have consequences on the doctrinal level, which can bring forth… clashes and disagreements with the church hierarchy. but it is precisely on these disagreements that the attention of historians has mainly been focused, leaving in shadows the fact that perhaps for the first time, what was in question in the movements was not the rule, but the life, not the ability to profess this or that article of faith, but the ability to live in a certain way, to practice joyfully and openly a certain form of life.
ie: a nother way
….. for this reason, when confronted with this ‘novelty’ the church’s strategy consisted on the one hand in seeking to order it, regulate it, and conform it so as to divert the movements in to a new monastic order or insert them into an already existing one. on the other hand, when this appeared impossible, the church shifted the conflict from the level of life to that of doctrine, condemning them as heretical.
carhart-harris entropy law et al..
in both cases, what remained unthought was precisely the
originary aspiration that has led the movements to reclaim a life and not a rule, a forma vitae and not a more or less coherent system of ideas and doctrines..
or more precisely, to propose not some new exegesis of the holy text, but its pure and simple identification with life, as if they did not want to read and interpret the gospel, but only live it.
we will ask ourselves, therefore, first of all if by these terms life, form of life (forma vitae), form of living (forma vivendi) they were attempting to name something the sense and novelty ..
of which still remain to be deciphered and which, precisely for this reason, has never ceased to intimately concern us.
it should concern us that we think we have to define/decipher things.. intellect ness is killing us
the semantic value of forma that the compilers of the thesaurus note for this case is imago, exemplar, exemplum, norma rerum, and as the passage from quintilian shows, it is likely that precisely the meaning of..
..had carried over to the coinage of the syntagma ..
…. in order to give you an example to imitate… 2 thess 3:9
graeber model/rev law et al
be a form of living for all, be an example…
the sense of forma here is ‘example, paradigm’ but the logic of the example is anything but simple and does not coincide with the application of a general law. forma vitae designates in this sense a way of life that, insofar as it strictly adheres to a form or model from which it cannot be separated, is thus constituted as an example.. that christ might hand down a form of life to humans by living
[note: choice is involved..or we wouldn’t be in the predicament we are.. no?]
when spiritual movements forcefully took up this syntagma starting from the 11th cent, the accent fell in equal measure on the two terms that composed it, to mean a perfect coincidence of life and form, example and follower. but it is only with the franciscans that the syntagma forma vitae assumes the character of a genuine technical term of monastic literature, and life as such becomes the question that is in every sense decisive.
in what this difference may consist and what the strategic sense of their conjunction might be (form of life and rule – regula and vita)
rule of life of brothers: live in obedience, in chastity, and w/o anything of their own…
zinn obedience law et al
from vita to vivere
live according to the form of the holy gospel..
had written in a few words the lord pope confirmed it for me
quid: what i must do
quod: that i must live
opposition is not only between what and that but also between doing and living..
the observation of precepts and norms and the simple fact of living according to a form…. as opponents and follower immediately understood, the form of the holy gospel is not in any way reducible to a normative code.
short code: obedience, chastity, w/o property
or how about just – love. just a and a.
ie: a nother way
100: mid para.. oi
indistinct use of the two terms.. life and rule… but it is, in truth, the exact opposite of a useless redundancy: the two words are put in a reciprocal tension, to *name something that cannot be named otherwise.
rather.. *to distract us.. we need to let go of naming the colour ness..
life or rule, that is to say, life as rule.. thomas
church was to be renewed… in three ways: by the form of life, the rule, and the doctrine of christ which he would provide…..pattern, rule, and teaching.. corresponds to the three levels or modes into which the activity of the church is structured. but it is decisive that the form of life corresponds here neither with a normative system canon law, nor with a corpus of doctrine (collection of dogmas). it is a third thing between doctrine and law, between rule and dogma and it is only from the awareness of his specificity that its definition can become possible.
? making me think of .. why have we not yet..
conversatio means ‘conduct’, ‘way of life’: by juxtaposing the term with forma, in a sense more or less equivalent to forma vitae, thomas shows that he has in mind not a simple way of life, but an exemplary, qualified way of life that cannot, however, be understood as a rule… i a preceding passage, the level of life.. forent proximis ad exemplum ‘how their life and behavior might… be an example to their neighbors’ is distinct in this sense both from that of observance of a rule.. ‘how they might sincerely observe and unfailingly guard the rule they had received’
in any case the syntagma form of life seems to acquire in franciscanism a technical meaning, and it is important not to let it elude us. …. this form is not a norm imposed on life, but a living that in following the life of christ gives itself and makes itself a form.
wearing shoes depends on a dispensation from the rule in case of necessity; not wearing shoes is the form of life..
ch 2 – renouncing law
defining relationship between rule and life…. .. because only a clear comprehension will render it possible to fully evaluate both the novelty and the inadequacy of the franciscan movement – its extraordinary success and its foreseeable failure, which seems to cloud the final years of its founder’s life with such a desperate bitterness.
it will be necessary first of all to examine the entire question of poverty in this light… the altissima paupertas..highest poverty.. which founder had intended to define the life of the friars minor, is in actuality the place where the fate of franciscanism is decided, both w/in the order (conflict between conventuals/spirituals) and in its relationships with the secular clergy and the curia, which reached the point of rupture under the pontificate of john xxii. historians have reconstructed the events of this controversy… from 1279……sanctioned the principle that the franciscans, having abdicated every right of both ownership and of use (quod proprietatem usus et rei cuiusque dominium a se abdicasse videtur), maintain however the simple de facto use over things.. … affirms the inseparability of use from ownership and attributes to the order the common ownership of the goods of which the make use..
from above – quid: what i must do….quod: that i must live
… the principle that remains immutable and nonnegotiable for them from beginning to end can be summarized in these terms: what is in question, for the order as for its founder, is the abdicatio omnis iuris – abdicatio of every right, that is, the possibility of a human existence beyond the law. what the franciscans never tire of confirming……is the lawfulness for the brothers of making use of goods w/o having any right to them (neither property nor of use). ….. as horse has de facto use but not property rights over the oats that it eats… so religious… simple defacto use of bread, wine, and clothes. …
from the perspective that is of interest to us here, franciscanism can be defined– and in this consists its novelty, even today unthought and in the present conditions of society totally unthinkable – as the attempt to..
realize a human life and practice absolutely outside the determinations of the law.
to simone et al.. can/must do this outside.. but because it’s natural.. starting place.. not as a ie: refusal/response/defense.. otherwise.. still spinning wheels/energies
if we call this life that is unattainable by law – form of life – then we can say that the syntagma forma vitae expresses the most proper intention of franciscanism.
animals humanized and called brothers..
term – friars minor had properly juridical implications, …. as minors, the franciscans are, from the juridical pov, technically … pupil… subjected to the tutelage of an adult…. if all christians .. are according to common law children of the supreme pontiff, .. submitted to his authority, but as emancipated children, capable of disposing of ecclesiastical goods, the franciscans are on the contrary – like little children and sons-in-power entirely subject to the rule of the supreme pontiff….in capable of possessing anything, because property belongs solely to the father, they can only use things.
oi.. no train.. let go
judge paul states: a madman and a minor cannot begin to own w/o the authorization of a tutor.. even though they may be in physical contact w/the object as would be the case if something were placed in the hand of a sleeping man.
in natural law all things are everyone’s…. property and all human law begin with the fall and the construction of a city on the part of cain.
apostles and friars minor could abdicate from themselves dominion and ownership over all things.. and retain to themselves at the same time the de facto use of all things.
on the ends of poverty, which defines poverty.. the free abdication of ownership for god’s sake, ..
the abdicatio iuris (with the return that it implies to the state of nature preceding the fall) and the separation of ownership from use constitute the essential apparatus that the franciscans use to technically define the peculiar condition that they call – poverty.
it is significant that the franciscan theorists obstinately aspire to configure the renunciation of the law in juridical terms.
thus hugh of digne…the friars minor – have only this to call their own not having anything of their own in transient things…..
Mary Ann tweets…
The formula for overturning the world, we didn’t seek it in books, but
in wandering. – GUY DEBORD
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/MaryAnnReilly/status/668055964239708160
nomadic ness.. as our way to us… not bound up on rights/laws/property ness..
wandering ness of us..
they have only this right, not to have any rights..
[via hugh of digne, of the friars minor]
already present in roman law.. in case of extreme necessity.. each has natural right the faculty of using things of others.. against… the pope, who states that there is no difference between right and permission.. (then) .. ‘therefore a permission to use is not a right of using’.. they have renounced all property and every faculty of appropriation, but not the natural right of use.. which is as it is a natural right.. unrenounceable..
oi.. all matters little if people aren’t legit free enough to grok enough ness.. to grok necessity
positive law that applies to human beings.. they have no right but only a license to use.. in the state of extreme necessity, they recover relationship w the law.. (natural, not positive)
a radical subtraction of life from the sphere of law
this is like creative refusal/response/defense.. all wasted energy.. not radical if subtraction..
olivi compares the franciscan rule to a sphere, which has christ as its center and which touches the level of earthly goods only at the – point of simple and necessary use– the state of necessity is the other tangent point, in which the franciscan form of life (the rule-life) touches on (natural not positive) law. it is between these to tangent points, the punctum usus and the tempus necessitatis, that we must situate the sphere of the minors’ rule-life that, in the words that immediately follow – is entirely reflected in a circle around christ ad his gospel as its own center and, i accordance w/ the form of a circle, it ends where it begins.. use and the state of necessity are the two extremes that define the francisca form of life.
begs a nother way.. org/detox around legit needs
softening of this difference (monastic condition and priestly office).. will correspond to the progressive clericalization of monks and their increasing integration into the church..
weird.. talking like office is a grace.. granting worthiness to the unworthy.. oi.. but where that ‘grace/worthiness’ is actually cancer/B.. et al
on merit – .. a question not of right an hierarchical succession, but of imitation of the apostolic life.
imitation/merit (meritocracy) .. not what we’re after.. no?
the heretics say in the preaching that merit works more toward consecrating and blessing, binding and loosing than order and office…
priesthood a matter of law and that office has nothing in common w religion and love
on … nothing more accomplished by good priest, and nothing less by a bad priest.. because it is confected not through thee merit of the priest, but through the word of the creator.. therefore, although the one doing the work is sometimes unclean, nevertheless the work done is always clean. the separation between life and office could not be expressed in clearer terms.
.. because the life of the friars minor is not defined by officium but solely by poverty
… but in no case does the divine office define franciscan identity (supposing that it would make sense to speak of identity for a life that refuses any property).
admin of officium.. ‘no one is to judge the priests even if they are sinners’
… highest poverty is the name that the regula bullata gives to this extraneousness to the law, but the technical term that defines the practice in which it is actualized in the franciscan literature is usus (simplex usus, usus facti, usus pauper).
ch 3 – highest poverty and use
defn of poverty purely negative – voluntary abdication of ownership for lord’s sake…defn property .. the right of dominion.. by which someone is said to be lord of some thing… .. two ways property is acquired according to roman law: occupation and obligation..
natural law, hugh responds, prescribes that everyone have use of the things necessary to their conservation, but doesn’t not obligate them in any way to ownership.
… of these (ownership, possession, usufruct, use).. only use is absolutely necessary to human life and, as such, unrenounceable..
to hannah arendt’s: politics as facil of necessities.. yet we don’t grok legit necessities
ie: a nother way
.. one of the secular masters’ objections – that in consumable things ownership cannot be separated from use
.. drinking and eating are presented as paradigms of purely factual human practice lacking any juridical implication..
need to go deeper than drinking/eating as necessities.. ie: maté basic needs
to get around the purely negative character of this defn, the declaration specifies that, like any preceptum negativum, this prescribes in truth two positive acts: wanting to have nothing of one’s own as the interior act, and using the thing as not one’s own as the exterior act
on those loving riches.. not using things.. because wanting to keep them
whoa.. lost in the policy ness.. letter of law ness in all this
.. a use that it is never possible to have and an abuse that always implies a right of ownership and is moreover always one’s own indeed define the very canon of mass consumption.
manufactured consent ness
what was originally common was not ownership but use..
the common use of things also genealogically precedes common or divided ownership of things, which derives only from human law.
fuller too much law et al
if it is true that olivi proposes in the quaestio,… an ontology of law and of signs, one nonetheless risks allowing the essential thing to escape if one does not specify the modality in which this ontology is articulated.
in the terms of medieval philosophy, this means that the realities in question are not situated on the level of essence or of the quid est, but only in that of existence or of the quod est; they are thus, as heidegger will write many centuries later, purely existential and not essential.
this means that in the very moment in which one admits a real efficacy to right and signs they are demoted from the level of essencesand made to hold as pure effectualities that depend solely on a command of the human or divine will.
olivi writes, you will fid that signification does not add to the real essence of the thing that is used as a sign anything other than the mental intention of those who have instituted it and accepted its validity and of those who accept it in action in order to signify and of those who hear it or receive it as a sign…. and the command produced by the intention of the one who signifies.
the sphere of human practice, with its rights and its signs, is real and efficacious, but it produces nothing essential, nor does it generate any new essence beyond its own effects. … form of life is the purely existential reality that must be liberated from the signature of law and office or duty.
… necessary .. not to forget that this doctrine was elaborated within a defensive strategy against attacks ..
so much of life.. played in defense mode.. we need a rev in reverse.. ness
the conflict w law.. or rather.. attempt to deactivate it and render it inoperative thru use.. is situated on same purely existential level on which the operativity of law/liturgy acts.. form of life is the purely existential reality that must be liberated from the signature of law and office or duty..
conclusions of our anal of poverty via fransiscan theorist.. this doctrine was elaborated w/in a defensive strategy against attacks from secular masters of paris..
let go of defense..
one can say that from this pov, francis was more prescient than his successors, in that he refused to articulate his vivere sine proprio in a juridical conceptuality and left it completely indeterminate. but also true .. ovitas vitae could be tolerated in small group……one can say … arguments of franciscan theorists are over/under valuation of law. on one hand, use its conceptuality and never call into question its validity or foundations, on the other, they think they can secure with juridical arguments the possibility, through abdicating the law, of pursuing an existence outside the law.
thinking of jordan‘s – tinkering with policy is a distraction. even though perhaps.. not deep enough still in his take.
laying bare the nature of ownership, which is thus revealed to have a reality that is only psychological (intention to possess the thing as one’s own) and procedural (power to claim in court).
savigny could define possession as the condition of fact, corresponding to property as the condition of law. the factum of possession forms a system, in this sense, with the right of ownership.
factual character of use not in itself sufficient to guarantee an exteriority w respect to the law.. because any fact an be transformed to a right, just a any right can imply a factual aspect.. entangle selves more an more in a juridical conceptuality by which they will finally be overwhelmed and defeated
what is lacking in franciscan lit is a defn of use in itself and not only in opposite to law.. the preoccupation w constructing a justification of use in juridical terms prevented them from collecting the hints of a theory of use present in the pauline letters..
sounds like he’s been saying.. in last couple pages.. that failure in the movement was in failure to define the actions – of form of life..
if so.. is that definable.. (i don’t think so)
and if so.. wouldn’t that then kill it.. (i think so)
(previous to this sounds like journal/diary clip) – in reality it is a matter of a restoration of the rules to their originary nature as transcription of the monks’ coversatio or way of life…
sounds like – perhaps self-talk as data.. could be the undefinition we’re seeking..?
the franciscan form of life is, in this sense, the end of all lives, the final modus, after which the manifold historical dispensation of modi vivendi is no longer possible. the ‘highest poverty,’ with its use of things, is the form-of-life that begins when all the west’s forms of life have reached their historical consummation.
143 – 144
what was lacking in the franciscan doctrine of use is precisely the connection with the idea of form of life that olivi’s text seems to implicitly demand. it is as if the … which… was to define the franciscan form of life as a perfect life…. lost its centrality once it was linked to the concept of usus facti and ended up being characterized only negatively with respect to the law. certainly, thanks to the doctrine of use… the franciscan life could be affirmed unreservedly as that existence which is situated *outside the law, which must abdicate the law in order to exist – and this is certainly the legacy that modernity has shown itself to be incapable of facing and that our time does not seem to be at all in a position to think. but what is life outside the law, if it is defined as that form of life which makes use of things w/o every appropriating them? and what is use, if one ceases to define it solely negatively w/respect to ownership?
*yeah.. that.. ie: simone: Need to ponder but I believe we have to play next institutions not just hope they emerge from technological innovations
it is the problem of the essential connection between use and form of life that is becoming undeferrable at this point. how can use – that is, a relation to the world insofar as it is inappropriable – be translated into an ethos and a form of life? and what ontology and which ethics would correspond to a life that, in use, is constituted as inseparable from its form? the attempt to respond to these questions will necessarily demand a confrontation with the operative ontological paradigm into whose mold liturgy, by means of a secular process, has ended up forcing the ethics and politics of the wet. use and form of life are the two apparatuses through which the franciscans tried, certainly in an insufficient way, to break this mold and confront that paradigm. but it is clear that only by taking up the confrontation again from a new perspective will we perhaps be able to decide whether and to what extent that which appears in olivi as the extreme form of life of the christian west has any meaning for it – or whether, on the contrary, the planetary dominion of he paradigm of operativity demands that the decisive confrontation be shifted to another terrain.
[ontology: the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.]
circling back to preface
object of this study is the attempt… to construct a form-of-life… linked so closely to its form that it proves to be inseparable from it.
rather.. it is first of all a matter of understanding the dialectic… between two terms rule and life. this dialectic is indeed so dense and complex that, in the eyes of modern scholars, it seems to resolve itself at times into a perfect identity: vita vel regula – life or rule, …. here it is preferable, however, to leave to the vel and the et all their semantic ambiguity, in order instead to look at the monastery as a field of forces run through by two intensities that are opposed and, at the same time, intertwined.
are they intertwined? by nature? or by human? is rule a given.?
in one case as in the other, what remained untouched was perhaps the most precious legacy of franciscanism, to which the west must return ever anew to contend with it as its undeferrable task: how to think a form of life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world that would never be substantiated into an appropriation. that is to say again: to think life as that which is never given as property but only as a common use.
such a task will demand the elaboration of a theory of use – which western philosophy lacks even the most elementary principles – and, … a critique of the operative and governmental ontology that continues, under various disguises, to determine the destiny of the human species. this task remains reserved for the final volume of homo sacer.
so – highest poverty (to me) is still – absence of all shalom.. completeness. and that completeness perhaps.. comes from.. can come from ..2 needs (a&a) .. deep enough to be the essence of each soul.
we can’t not.