elinor ostrom
[image links to her 2009 lecture (video) for nobel prize]
7 min – a mixed (large and small) was the best.. and we found that complexity is not the same as chaos
15 min – when i did my dissertation i didn’t understand i was studying the commons
17 min – if there is not good way to communicate.. overuse/overharvest of resources.. using resource and property for same thing not good..
25 min – learning to trust..
we should not be recommending panaceas.. and we should not be rejecting complexity.. but rather learn to live with it.
antifragile ness
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shared by Rob on twitter (article from 2010):
http://www.shareable.net/blog/no-panaceas-elinor-ostrom-talks-with-fran-korten
..he was addressing a problem of considerable significance that we need to take seriously. It’s just that he went too far. He said people could never manage the commons well.
not sure what is meant by shame taking a role in this..
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I’m not against government. I’m just against the idea that it’s got to be some bureaucracy that figures everything out for people.
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To manage common property you need to create boundaries for an area at a size similar to the problem the people are trying to cope with. But it doesn’t need to be a formal jurisdiction. Sometimes public officials don’t even know that the local people have come to some agreements. It may not be in the courts, or even written down. That is why sometimes public authorities wipe out what local people have spent years creating.
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Elinor “Lin” Ostrom (born Elinor Claire Awan; August 7, 1933 – June 12, 2012) was an American political economist whose work was associated with the New Institutional Economics and the resurgence of political economy. In 2009, she shared the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Oliver E. Williamson for “her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons”. To date, she remains the only woman to win The Prize in Economics.
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Her work emphasized the multifaceted nature of human–ecosystem interaction and argues against any singular “panacea” for individual social-ecological system problems.
Design principles for Common Pool Resource (CPR) institutions
Ostrom identified eight “design principles” of stable local common pool resource management:
- Clearly defined boundaries (effective exclusion of external un-entitled parties);
- Rules regarding the appropriation and provision of common resources that are adapted to local conditions;
- Collective-choice arrangements that allow most resource appropriators to participate in the decision-making process;
- Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or accountable to the appropriators;
- A scale of graduated sanctions for resource appropriators who violate community rules;
- Mechanisms of conflict resolution that are cheap and of easy access;
- Self-determination of the community recognized by higher-level authorities; and
- In the case of larger common-pool resources, organization in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small local CPRs at the base level.
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In 2009, Ostrom became the first woman to receive the prestigious Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences cited Ostrom “for her analysis of economic governance”, saying her work had demonstrated how common property could be successfully managed by groups using it. Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson shared the 10-million Swedish kronor (£910,000; $1.44 million) prize for their separate work in economic governance.
The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences said Ostrom’s “research brought this topic from the fringe to the forefront of scientific attention…by showing how common resources – forests, fisheries, oil fields or grazing lands – can be managed successfully by the people who use them rather than by governments or private companies”. Ostrom’s work in this regard challenged conventional wisdom, showing that common resources can be successfully managed without government regulation or privatization.
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share via John:
http://evonomics.com/the-search-for-a-better-economics-part-ii-of-my-journey/
J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy is a meditation on the corrupting influence of power. I felt like Frodo making his way towards Mordor in my effort to understand economic theory, but the person who came closest to playing a Frodo-like role in the recent history of economic thinking is Elinor Ostrom.
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Unbeknownst to her, Lin had stumbled upon a radically different configuration of ideas than the mathematical empire dominating economic theory. The mathematical empire was founded on the assumption that self-interest automatically leads to collective wellbeing. Lin’s work was founded upon a stubborn fact of life: self-interest often leads to the overexploitation of resources and other problems that make life worse for everyone, not better. When everyone was allowed to suck as much water out of the ground as they pleased, there was no invisible hand to rescue the situation.
and no real freedom to keep them from it.. from hearing the voice inside… telling them they had enough.. we haven’t yet given that scenario a chance.
The temptation to free-ride makes public goods difficult to maintain, as the ecologist Garrett Hardin observed in a famous paper titled “The Tragedy of the Commons” published in the journalScience in 1968. It was still a backwater subject in political science when Lin started working on it, as strange as that might seem today.
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Lin’s police work continued to explore the new intellectual territory that she had discovered previously with her work on water regulation, which emphasized the importance of decentralization and emergence but in a way that required richly structured interactions at the local level. ..,,Lin was pioneering the art and science of managing the process of cultural evolution without ever using the E-word.
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Her database included 100 case studies of farmer’s associations in the tiny nation of Nepal alone, each managing their irrigation systems in their own way. Nevertheless, she was able to show that the diverse solutions reflected a smaller number of design principles, which she articulated in her most influential work, titled Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, published in 1990…….her use of the E-word in the title primarily reflected her own extensive experience studying how groups of people adapt to the challenges of their respective environments in the real world.
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Here are the eight ingredients that enable groups to effectively manage their affairs (in my own words), which I like to call Lin Ostrom’s recipe for success.
same as design principles above from wikipedia
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Steve Levitt was right about the import of the Nobel Prize going to Lin Ostrom. It signaled that something was rotten about the mathematical empire and that a new paradigm needs to begin from a different starting point. But what would the new paradigm look like and what would be its theoretical foundation?
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feb 2016 – the woman who save econ from disaster – same as above.. re read
http://evonomics.com/the-woman-who-saved-economics-from-disaster/
When she told her husband that she wanted to get her PhD, he found this unacceptable and they soon divorced. She recalls this without bitterness, adding that she also found the life of a corporate lawyer’s wife unappealing. She physically shuddered when she recalled the parties that she had to attend, with all the men in one room and all the wives in another.
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Lin studied the process whereby the various stakeholders negotiated a workable set of rules without requiring government intervention. It was a success story that she called public entrepreneurship.
Unbeknownst to her, Lin had stumbled upon a radically different configuration of ideas than the mathematical empire dominating economic theory. The mathematical empire was founded on the assumption that self-interest automatically leads to collective wellbeing. Lin’s work was founded upon a stubborn fact of life: self-interest often leads to the overexploitation of resources and other problems that make life worse for everyone, not better. When everyone was allowed to suck as much water out of the ground as they pleased, there was no invisible hand to rescue the situation.
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local stakeholders got together and negotiated their own agreement, including rules about water use enforced by punishment. Collective wellbeing was achieved, at least roughly, and there was something emergent and self-organizing about the way it happened—but the process of negotiation bore no resemblance whatsoever to the assumptions of the mathematical empire, which even has trouble accommodating the concept of norms, as we have seen.
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Lin used her first opportunity to work intensively with a group of graduate students to focus on the subject of public goods. .. The temptation to free-ride makes public goods difficult to maintain, as the ecologist Garrett Hardin observed in a famous paper titled “The Tragedy of the Commons” published in the journalScience in 1968. …Lynn and her students spent their first semester reading the scattered literature and she expected them to choose a public good for them to collectively start studying themselves during the next semester.
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studied the social organization of police departments, using rigorous methods to show that smaller units were often better integrated with the communities that they served and more responsive to their needs.
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importance of decentralization and emergence but in a way that required richly structured interactions at the local level. The emergence emphatically did not result from individuals following only their self-regarding preferences. Sometimes it didn’t happen at all.
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Lin was pioneering the art and science of managing the process of cultural evolution without ever using the E-word.
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her most influential work, titled Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, published in 1990. By this time Lin had read a little bit about evolution on her own but her use of the E-word in the title primarily reflected her own extensive experience studying how groups of people adapt to the challenges of their respective environments in the real world.
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via fb share in p2p
[https://medium.com/incites/evolve-and-adapt-rapidly-cdb9df696728]
“We have never had to deal with problems of the scale facing today’s globally interconnected society. No one knows for sure what will work, so it is important to build a system that can evolve and adapt rapidly.” — Elinor Ostrom
indeed.. ie: a nother way
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pdf – governing the commons
http://wtf.tw/ref/ostrom_1990.pdf
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Elinor Ostrom’s Rules for Radicals by Derek Wall (@Anothergreen). https://t.co/oBS4ydUvZp https://t.co/KiceVwo9jw
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/teemul/status/936477893621886977
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Howard fb share
A summary of one of the most important scientific examinations of the ways humans solve social dilemmas (such as the tragedy of the commons). Such dilemmas are at the heart of the most pressing global problems — climate change, proliferation of nuclear weapons, preservation of endangered resources, management of spectrum, net neutrality and other issues around online governance.
on twitter:
Summary of Ostrom’s “Governing the Commons,” one of the most important scientific approaches to social dilemmas – shd be more widely read https://t.co/wYnQzWoExz
Original Tweet: https://twitter.com/hrheingold/status/947611530308096000
http://cooperationcommons.com/node/361
findings:
1\ People are trapped by the Prisoner’s Dilemma only if they treat themselves as prisoners by passively accepting the suboptimum strategy
krishnamurti free will law.. we have no idea
2\ Changing the rules of the game to turn zero-sum games into non-zero-sum games may be one way to describe the arc of civilization for the past 8000 years
She found that in many different cultures all over the world, some groups would find ways to overcome the obstacles that defeated others – by creating contracts, agreements, incentives, constitutions, signals, media to enable cooperation for mutual benefit.
perhaps if need incentives.. contracts.. et al.. red flag we’re doing it wrong..
3\ Social dilemmas of multiple dimensions are obstacles on the path to creating institutions for collective action
Systemic information about salinization of wells was an obstacle to water-sharing agreements in California; individual water-users knew whether their wells were pumping salt, but none of them had compiled the information to see the overall pattern in the watershed, and no individual was willing to pay the price of gathering it.
perhaps obstacle is people have never been free.. so never been our indigenous selves.. betting.. like h/g via suzman.. we’d not need systemic info about salinization of wells and water sharing.. we have no idea what we’d be like
Ostrom argued from well-documented cases of informal institutions that had evolved into formal if localized arrangements, sometimes lasting for centuries, that groups could evolve effective institutions without externally coercive authority – if they could solve the “common set of problems.”
Ostrom claims that “all efforts to organize collective action, whether by an external ruler, an entrepreneur, or a set of principals who wish to gain collective benefits, must address a common set of problems.” *These problems are “coping with free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules.“
imagine we make those irrelevant.. via gershenfeld sel .. no desire to free ride.. no need to commit.. no need for institutions.. no need for monitoring .. no need for compliance.. no need for set of rules..
ie: hlb via 2 convos that io dance.. as the day..[aka: not part\ial.. for (blank)’s sake…].. a nother way
4/ Ostrom found that groups that are able to organize and govern their behavior successfully are marked by the following design principles:
- Group boundaries are clearly defined.
- Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions.
- Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
- The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities.
- A system for monitoring member’s behavior exists; the community members themselves undertake this monitoring.
- A graduated system of sanctions is used.
- Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
- For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises
1\ how could they be clearly defined.. if alive and changing everyday.. no boundaries (borders)(marsh label law) – unless we want to call idio-jargon and/or daily curiosity labels boundaries
2\ have/need ness
3\ has to be all
4\ mech to listen to all the voices
5\ assume good
6\ your own song et al
7\ i know you ness and detox
8\ fractal ing stigmergy ness – stack ness
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eo’s rules for radicals by Derek Wall
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in kate‘s doughnut econ
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elinor: we have never had to deal w problems of the scale facing today’s globally interconnected society. no one know s for sure wha will work, so it is important to build a system that can evolve and adapt rapidly..
2 convos .. as antifragile infra.. elinor
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from hardt and negri ‘s assembly:
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we whole heartedly endorse ostrom’s claim that the common must be managed through systems of democratic participation. we part ways w her, however, when she insists that the community that shares access and decision making must be small and limited by clear boundaries to divide those inside from outside.. we have greater ambitions and are interested instead in more expansive democratic experiences that are open to others, and we will have to demo the feasibility of such a new, fuller form of democracy today in the following chapters..
yay..
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ostrom’s formation of ‘common-pool resource’ often seem to name merely another form of property.. the common stands in contrast to property in a more radical way, by eliminating the character of exclusion from the rights of both use and decision making, instituting instead schema of open, shared use and democratic governance..
cool.. hope that means sans money/measure.. otherwise.. still a form of property.. (and so a disturbance to ecosystem)
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via michel fb share on smart contracts:
wow, a very specific linkage here between commons governance and smart contracts:
“Ostrom’s principles can give us great insights into why economic cooperation can succeed or fail. What if we can compile Ostrom’s principles into a software product? Basically an economy-to-go for all the regions where Ostrom’s principles are naturally missing? Would this “deliverable economy” then indeed enable cooperation and sustainable self-governance?
Astonishingly, it is possible to translate Ostrom’s groundbreaking ideas into digital equivalences — thanks to smart contracts.”
[https://medium.com/@daviddao/decentralized-sustainability-9a53223d3001]
AI smart contractsleverage this new kind of programming.They are machine learning algorithms with blockchain-based business logic — or in other words,an analytical machine that can guide human behavior via designed incentives.
i’m thinking if we think we need incentives.. we’re doing it wrong
In this blog post, we argue that these incentive programs are highly scalable and might even provide a design-principled solution to one of the biggest environmental problems in human society: The Tragedy of the Commons.
biggest environ problems isn’t tragedy of commons.. it’s that we disturbed the undisturbed ecosystem.. thinking.. tragedy of commons.. is keeping us in that disturbed state.. we need to let go .. set people truly free.. and trust that dance
commoning.. et al
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Stephen Pimentel (@StephenPiment) tweeted at 3:21 PM on Fri, Mar 01, 2019:
Anarchist Themes in the Work of Elinor Ostrom
by @KevinCarson1
https://t.co/fKY9z9T1DF
(https://twitter.com/StephenPiment/status/1101608496066252800?s=03)
article – on 38 page pdf – from 2014 by Kevin
Even when the knowledge base is similar, no guarantee exists that government officials (or the researchers who advise them) will use available information to make efficient and/or sustainable decisions.6
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8 min video on tragedy of commons via michel fb share –
Sustainable development and the tragedy of commons
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=4&v=ByXM47Ri1Kc]
hardin’s beyond tragedy of commons – had some truth
3 min – many not able to roam and steal.. so ie: farmers, fisheries, .. commons.. but then have to create rule sand determine who is a member.. who can access when.. the assumption is that those rules have to come from the state
5 min – have to recognized when humans have ownership rights.. in commons.. frequently can determine rules and find ways of adjusting them over time (arguing.. talking about it).. and in time they grow trust for one another..
unconditional trust is an oxymoron.. we have to get back/to an undisturbed ecosystem
7 min – if actually protect biodiversity.. complex systems.. have to have local .. rich .. knowledge.. my model – build enough diversity..
let’s just facil daily curiosity ie: cure ios city
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ostrom 8 in a chart
@hrheingold: A one page summary of Governing The Commons: cooperationcommons.com/node/361
@/KateRaworth: What does it take to manage a commons well? Elinor Ostrom had it down to 8 principles. Commoners, listen up and let’s learn. These are 21st century skills… vimeo.com/67418343
from 7 min video (2012)
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be you. 