mariana mazzucato

mariana

intro’d to Mariana via Mike when he shared this talk:

the entrepreneurial state

de-encroach ourselves…

10 min – many people don’t know how much govt has funded ie: tech innovation – apple et al

20 min – there’s plenty of money out there. but what is needed is patient, long term, committed finance 

why haven’t we learned how to socialize the rewards..

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tedglobal 2013:

all smart parts of smart phone – were all govt funded

5 min – internet and siri funded by darpa, gps funded by navastar, touchscreen display by grants cia & nsf

defense/military funding true in sector after sector and dept after dept

75% of revolutionary drugs were funded by the state

state was fixing but also shaping

state as vc

 

 

vc is short term.. innovation takes much longer than that

what we actually need are public/private partnerships…

we need to build entrepreneurial state organizations.. 

if the state is more than a market fixer.. it is a shaper/financer.. where is the reward..? for the state.. for having taken on these massive risks… ie: the internet.

economists often think the reward back to the state is tax. not true – ie: many jobs created go abroad.. [which is fine – shouldn’t be nationalistic) …..apple (and others) did get some. .. but paid very little tax back. 

perhaps we need a return generating mechanism that’s better than tax. ie: retaining equity

ie: .05% of what the internet produced brought back to an innovation fund

if the state is thought about in this way – as one of the lead players – in the value creation mechanism – then maybe the returns will not only be green, but smart, .. and also inclusive – so public ed et al gets rewards..

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her book:

the entrepreneurial state

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

book links to amazon

pdf (pamphlet)

Of course there are plenty of examples of private
sector entrepreneurial activity, from the role of young new
companies in providing the dynamism behind new sectors
(eg Google), to the important source of funding from private
sources like venture capital. But this is the only story that is
usually told. Silicon Valley and the emergence of the biotech
industry are usually attributed to the geniuses behind the
small high tech firms like Facebook or the plethora of small
biotech companies in Boston or Cambridge in the UK.
Europe’s ‘lag’ behind the USA is often attributed to its weak
venture capital sector. Examples from these high tech sectors
in the USA are often used to argue why we need less state and
more market: to allow Europe to produce its own Googles.

But how many people know that the algorithm that led to
Google’s success was funded by a public sector National
Science Foundation grant?
7 Or that molecular antibodies,
which provided the foundation for biotechnology before
venture capital moved into the sector, were discovered in
public Medical Research Council (MRC) labs in the UK?
Or that many of the most innovative young companies in the
USA were funded not by private venture capital but by public
venture capital such as through the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) programme?

Lessons from these experiences are important. They force
the debate to go beyond the role of the state in stimulating
demand, or the role of the state in ‘picking winners’ in
industrial policy, where taxpayers’ money is potentially
misdirected to badly managed firms in the name of progress,
distorting incentives as it goes along. Instead it is a case for
a targeted, proactive, entrepreneurial state, able to take risks,
creating a highly networked system of actors harnessing the 

best of the private sector for the national good over a medium-
to long-term horizon. It is the state as catalyst, and lead
investor, sparking the initial reaction in a network that will
then cause knowledge to spread. The state as creator of the
knowledge economy.
Chapter 1 sets the
scene by summarising the academic framework regarding
the debate around growth; ……
Specifically, it draws on recent academic literature to show
that targeting resources towards R&D spend, patenting or
small firms in isolation misses the point and that similarly
waiting for venture capital to do all the heavy lifting is likely
to be futile.
Chapter 2 describes the importance of the government’s
role in investing where the private sector will not, in the most
uncertain risky areas. But rather than understanding this
through the usual lens of ‘market failures’, the concept of
entrepreneurial risk-taking is introduced. The public sector
has indeed fulfilled an important role in undertaking the most
risky research, even when that research was not ‘basic’. Private
sector examples are provided from the pharmaceutical and
biotech industries where it has been the state, not the private
sector, that has created economic dynamism.

Chapter 3 argues that it is only by creating a so-called
national system of innovation built on sharing knowledge
that the necessary, if not sufficient, conditions start to
be established. A

Chapter 4 examines aspects of the recent industrial
policy history of the USA, and shows that despite common
perceptions, the US state has been extremely proactive and
entrepreneurial in the development and commercialisation
of new technologies. Four examples — the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR), orphan drugs and recent developments in
nanotechnology — are used to illustrate this point.

Chapter 5 provides some reflections that are relevant
to the situation faced by the UK at the moment, with policy
recommendations for the development of green technology,
and technology, generally. 

chapter 6 concludes with some reflections on
the implications of the concept of the entrepreneurial state for
the debate around fairness and distribution.

A smart innovation agenda, in short, would be quite different from
the one that most rich governments seem to favour. It would be
more about freeing markets and less about picking winners; more
about creating the right conditions for bright ideas to emerge and
less about promises like green jobs. But pursuing that kind of policy
requires courage and vision — and most of the rich economies are
not displaying enough of either.12 

views about growth are espoused with great vehemence,
often ignorant of the underlying theoretical assumptions and
origins, so well put by Keynes:
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when
they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than
is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else.
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air,
are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few
years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.

Myth-busting 1: R&D is not enough

Myth-busting 2: Small is not necessarily beautiful

Myth-busting 3: Venture capital is not so risk-loving

In the USA, government
programmes such as the Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR) programme and the Advanced Technology Program
(ATP) in the US Dept of Commerce have provided 20–25 per
cent of total funding for early stage technology firms. Thus
government has played a leading role not only in the early
stage research illustrated in figure 2, but also in the commercial
viability stage. Auerswald and Branscomb claim that
government funding for early stage technology firms is equal to
the total investments of ‘business angels’ and about two to eight
times the amount invested by private venture capital.5

Myth-busting 4: A patent doesn’t necessarily
mean progress

Joseph Schumpeter, an entrepreneur is a person,
or group of people, who is willing and able to convert
a new idea or invention into a successful innovation.
It is not just about setting up a new business (the more
common definition), but doing so in a way that produces
a new product, or a new process, or a new market for an
existing product or process. Entrepreneurship, he wrote,
employs ‘the gale of creative destruction’ to replace in
whole or in part inferior innovations across markets and
industries, simultaneously creating new products including
new business models, and in so doing destroying the lead
of the incumbents.62 In this way, creative destruction is
largely responsible for the dynamism of industries and
long-run economic growth. Each major new technology
leads to creative destruction: the steam engine, the railway,
electricity, electronics, the car, the computer, the internet
have all destroyed as much as they have created but led to
increased wealth overall.
For Frank H Knight and Peter Drucker
entrepreneurship is about taking risk.63 The behaviour of
the entrepreneur is that of a person willing to put his or her
career and financial security on the line and take risks in the
name of an idea, spending much time as well as capital on an
uncertain venture.
In fact, entrepreneurial risk-taking, like technological
change, is not just risky, it is highly ‘uncertain’. Knight
distinguished risk from uncertainty in the following way:
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and
uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome

in a group of instances is known… While in the case of uncertainty
that is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to
form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a
high degree unique.64
John Maynard Keynes also emphasised these differences:
By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to
distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable.
The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty…The
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of
a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of
interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention…
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any
calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know!
6

At a more micro level, Block and Keller find that between
1971 and 2006, 77 out of the most important 88 innovations
(rated by R&D Magazine’s annual awards) were found to have
been fully dependent on federal support, especially, but not
only, in the early phases.72
These examples are fundamental for understanding the
impact of publicly funded research. It is not just about funding
blue sky research but creating visions around new important
technologies.

At a more micro level, Block and Keller find that between
1971 and 2006, 77 out of the most important 88 innovations
(rated by R&D Magazine’s annual awards) were found to have
been fully dependent on federal support, especially, but not
only, in the early phases.72
These examples are fundamental for understanding the
impact of publicly funded research. It is not just about funding
blue sky research but creating visions around new important
technologies.

Government’s role in not only creating knowledge
(through national labs and universities) but also mobilising
resources, and allowing knowledge and innovations to diffuse
across sectors and the economy, is key in this view, either
through existing networks or by facilitating new ones.
Our view, however, is that having a national system of
innovation, rich in horizontal as well as vertical networks,
is not sufficient in itself. The state has a further role to play
to lead the process of industrial development, developing
strategies for technological advance in priority areas.

Unlike in a developing economy, where the technology
is already available elsewhere in the world, an entrepreneurial
state does not yet know what the details of the innovation are,
but it knows a general area that is ripe for development, or
where pushing the boundaries of knowledge are desirable.
The state welcomes and engages with Knightian uncertainty for
the exploration and production of new products which lead to
economic growth.

It has done so not just by funding basic research. More
importantly, it has taken the lead by formulating a vision of a

new area (for example the internet or the genetic sequence);
investing in the earliest-stage research and development which
the private sector is unable or unwilling to do (for example
when the market prefers to invest in safe ‘me too’ medicines
rather than risky new molecular entities); identifying and
supporting multiple new paths and adjusting rules to promote
them (for example changes in regulation that allow publicly
funded research to be patented); creating and funding
networks that bring together business, academia and finance
(for example SBIR in the USA); and being constantly ahead
of the game in areas that will drive the next decades of growth
(for example nanotechnology and green technology today)

The next chapter argues that despite the perception of
the USA as the epitome of private-sector led wealth creation,
in reality the state has been engaged on a massive scale in
entrepreneurial risk-taking to spur innovation. Four main
examples are given: the roles of DARPA, SBIR, the Orphan
Drug Act and the National Nanotechnology Initiative in
the USA (the EU passed its own Orphan Drug Act in 2001,
imitating the US Act passed in 1983). What they share is a

DARPA was set up to give the USA technological
superiority in different sectors, mainly but not only related
to technology, and has always been aggressively mission
oriented. It has a budget of more than $3 billion per year, 240
staff, operates flexibly with few overheads, and is connected to
but separated from government. It has successfully recruited
high quality programme managers who are willing to take
risks because of their short term contracts, which last anywhere
between four and six years. Its structure is meant to bridge the
gap between blue sky academic work, with long time horizons, and
the more incremental technological development in the military

The launching of Sputnik in 1957 by the Soviets led to
the eruption of panic among US policy makers, fearful that
they were losing the technological battle. The creation of
DARPA in 1958 was a direct result. Before the formation of
DARPA the military was the sole controller of all military
R&D dollars. Through the formation of DARPA a portion of
military spending on R&D was now designated to ‘blue sky
thinking’ — ideas that went beyond the horizon in that they
may not produce results for ten or 20 years. As a result of this
mandate DARPA was free to focus on advancing innovative
technological development with novel strategies. This opened
numerous windows for scientists and engineers to propose
innovative ideas and receive funding and assistance.103
Going way beyond simply funding research, DARPA
funded the formation of computer science departments,
provided start-up firms with early research support,

contributed to semiconductor research and support to human
computer interface research, and oversaw the early stages of
the internet. Many of these critical activities were carried out
by its Information Processing Techniques Office, originally
established in 1962. Such strategies contributed hugely to
the development of the computer industry during the 1960s
and 1970s, and as a variety of research reveals, many of the
technologies later incorporated in the design of the personal
computer were developed by DARPA-funded researchers.

In the area of computer chip fabrication during the
1970s, DARPA assumed the expenses associated with getting
a design into a prototype by funding a laboratory affiliated
with the University of Southern California. Anyone who
possessed a superior design for a new microchip could have the
chips fabricated at this laboratory, thus expanding the pool of
participants designing faster and better microchips

The personal computer emerged during this time with
Apple introducing the first one in 1976. Following this, the
computer industry’s boom in Silicon Valley and the key role
of DARPA in the massive growth of personal computing
received significant attention, but has since been forgotten
by those who claim Silicon Valley is an example of ‘free
market’ capitalism.

Contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the domination
of free market ideology during the Reagan Administration,
the US government in the 1980s, in fact, acted to build on
the successes of DARPA’s decentralised industrial policy.
One of the most significant events during this period was
the signing of the Small Business Innovation Development
Act by Reagan in 1982, as a consortium between the Small
Business Administration and different government agencies
like the Department of Defence, Department of Energy
and Environmental Protection Agency. The Act was based
on a National Science Foundation (NSF) pilot programme
initiated during the Carter administration. The Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) programme required government
agencies with large research budgets to designate a fraction
(originally 1.25 per cent) of their research funding to support
initiatives of small, independent, for-profit firms. The
programme has provided support to a significant number of
highly innovative start-up firms.107
it serves as the first place
many entrepreneurs involved in technological innovation
go for funding. The programme, which provides more than
$2 billion per year in direct support to high-tech firms, has
fostered development of new enterprises, and has guided the
commercialisation of hundreds of new technologies from
the laboratory to the market. Given the instrumental role of
the SBIR programme and its successes, it is surprising how
little attention this programme receives

government’s role for both during the 2000s:
The US government still serves as an investor in knowledge creation,
subsidizer of drug development, protector of drug markets, and, last
but not least… purchaser of the drugs that the biopharmaceutical
companies have to sell. The BP industry has become big business
because of big government, and… remains highly dependent on big
government to sustain its commercial success

From this brief overview of these three examples
— DARPA, SBIR and orphan drugs — a general point can be
drawn: the USA has spent the last few decades using active
interventionist policies to drive private sector innovation in
pursuit of public policy goals. What all three interventions
have in common is that they do not tie the shirt-tails of
government to any one firm; no accusations of lame-duck
industrial policy here. Instead it is a nimble government that
rewards innovation and directs resources over a relatively
short time horizon to the companies that show promise,
through either supply-side (DARPA) or through demand side
and start up interventions (SBIR and orphan drugs). Either
way, the government has not simply created the ‘conditions
for innovation’, but actively funded the early radical research
and created the necessary networks between state agencies
and the private sector to allow the commercial development to occur

currently the US government spends approximately
$1.8 billion annually on the NNI

p. 105

In addition, the current US administration created a new
programme, ARPA-E, which is modelled specifically on the
DARPA model ‘to focus on “out of the box” transformational
research that industry by itself cannot or will not support
due to its high risk but were success would provide dramatic
benefits for the nation’.155 The agency is charged with bringing
forth a new, exciting direction to energy research that ‘will
attract many of the U.S.’s best and brightest minds — those
of experienced scientists and engineers, and especially, those
of students and young researchers, including persons in the
entrepreneurial world’.156 Using the DARPA model ARPA-E’s
organisation is ‘flat, nimble, and sparse, capable of sustaining
for long periods of time those projects whose promise remains
real, while phasing out programmes that do not prove to
be as promising as anticipated’

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARPA-E

http://arpa-e.energy.gov/

director – Cheryl Martin

In finance, it is commonly accepted that there is a
relationship between risk and return. However, in the
innovation game, this has not been the case. Risk-taking has
been a collective endeavour while the returns have been much
less collectively distributed. Often, the only return that the
state gets for its risky investments are the indirect benefits
of higher tax receipts that result from the growth that is
generated by those investments. Is that enough?
There is indeed lots of talk of partnership between
the government and private sector, yet while the efforts are
collective, the returns remain private. Is it right that the
National Science Foundation did not reap any financial return
from funding the grant that produced the algorithm that led
to Google’s search engine?

The lack of knowledge in the public domain about
the central entrepreneurial role that government plays in the
growth of economies worldwide, beyond Keynesian demand
management and ‘creating the conditions’ for growth, is
currently putting the successful model in major danger.

Many of the problems being faced today by the Obama
administration are indeed due to the fact that US taxpayers
are virtually unaware of how their taxes foster innovation
and growth in the USA, and that corporations that have
made money from innovation that has been supported by the
government are neither returning a significant portion of the
profits to the government nor investing in new innovation.163
They are sold the idea that this growth occurs as a result of
individual ‘genius’, to Silicon Valley ‘entrepreneurs’, to venture
capitalists, to what they think is a ‘weak’ state compared with
the European system.

interesting reading this alongside – mayors rule the world.. the combo is screaming/whispering.. none of us if one of us.. so all of us..
1

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Mariana is hosting a reinventors roundtable may 29 2014 – on (her book) and reinventing risk and reward…

preview:

we have no framework to understand the massive risk taking role of the public sector – so have completely ignored the question – should the state be earning back some of that reward..

market failure theory – state important to appropriate returns on failure – fund basic research, ed, infrastructure.. but what we don’t understand – innovation behind iphone, gps, … we have govt doing so much more that fixing…

3 min – compaq & intel got sbir (small business innovaiton research) money – apple got sbic (small business innovation ) money

steve jobs biography doesn’t mention any of govt funding.. elon musk as well. – tesla got 500 mill – early stage high risk finance.. cilindra same – but it lost

not how to pick winners and losers – but think how vc’s works… so that profits cover losses.. we don’t have this flow in govt.. because we don’t admit govt had a part of funding initially

saying that govt payback is taxes – problem is that most of these companies don’t pay much tax

today – doesn’t seem that govt risk taking – will not be returned via taxes..

 

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find/follow Mariana:

link twitter

wikipedia small

 

 

 

 

In 2011 Mazzucato published a book for DEMOS, The Entrepreneurial State, in which she argues that the most risky and uncertain investments underlying most technological revolutions were undertaken by public sector agencies. She claims that neither the ‘market failure‘ perspective nor the National Systems of Innovation perspective, have adequately studied the risk-taking role of the public sector, and its ability to set the vision and ‘mission’ for private sector growth. She also argues that while private risk finance is lacking in many sectors, most venture capital investments in Silicon Valley were riding the wave of public sector investments. Developing this argument, in a 2012 paper for the think tank Policy Network entitled The Risk-Reward Nexus, Mazzucato argues that central to this policy debate is an understanding of the tension between how value is created and how value is extracted in modern day capitalism. Offering a new perspective on why ‘smart’ innovation-led growth has not led to ‘inclusive growth’, she argues that there is a disproportionate balance between the ‘collective’ distribution of risk taking in the innovation process, and the increasingly narrow distribution of the rewards. Similarly, she argues in another paper for the think tank Policy Network called Rebalancing What?, Mazzucato argues that the problem is not only one of short-termism, it is also about the way in which financial activities focused on value extraction have been rewarded above activities focused on value creation – often leading to value destruction.

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money ness

 

 

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talk from Vinay

LET’S SAVE THE WORLD AND MAKE A LOT OF MONEY

Vinay Gupta (@leashless) tweeted at 5:58 AM on Mon, Sep 25, 2017:
https://t.co/vfdpzj2gtl here are my slides discussing what it would take to ICO Elon Musk’s Mars mission.

Talk was fine but too short!
(https://twitter.com/leashless/status/912285226260365314?s=03)

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4w3Tams6OYoTGJJdzNDWjFIeE0/view

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book out in sept 2018 – value of everything

Mariana Mazzucato (@MazzucatoM) tweeted at 3:17 PM on Fri, May 11, 2018:
Fun long interview @FT magazine on family, work, books, and water—-and loved that Delphine, the journalist, couldn’t resist and jumped in the pool with me! https://t.co/e1TirDrLN6
(https://twitter.com/MazzucatoM/status/995050187113582598?s=03)

on hold

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the neoliberal critique of Mazuccato’s ‘s book:

https://www.piqd.com/…/why-mariana-mazzucato-is-wrong-about?

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value of everything notes/quotes:

intro

xvii

in all these cases, from fin to pharma and it, govts bend over backwards to attract these supposedly value creating individuals and co’s dangling before them tax reductions and exemptions from the red tape .. media heap wealth creators w praise, politicians court them, high status figures to be admired and emulated. but who decided that they are creating value? what defn of value is used to distinguish vale creation from value extraction, or even from value destruction

xviii

plato recognized that stories from character, culture and behaviour: ‘our first business is to surprise the production of stories, and chose only those we think suitable, and reject the rest. we shall persuade mothers and nurses to tell our chosen stories to their children, and by means of them to mould their minds and characters rather than their bodies.. the greater part of the stories current today we shall have to reject’..

1 – brief history of value

38

value was gold, then land, then production

xix

if we cannot define what we mean by value, we cannot be sure to produce it, nor to share it fairly , nor to sustain economic growth

dang.. yuck to all that..  maybe it’s because we can’t define value that’s it’s valuable..

graeber values law

6

value can be defined in diff ways, but at its heart it is the production of new goods/services..

says who..?

by value creation i mean the ways in which diff types of resources (human, physical and intangible) are established and interact to produce new goods/services. by value extraction i mean activities focuses on moving around existing resources and outputs and gaining disproportionately from the ensuing trade..

7

the swing from value deteriming price to price determining value coincided w major social changes at the end of the 19th cent..

value shouldn’t have anything to do w price

8

socialism based its demands for reforms on the claim that labour was not being rewarded fairly for the value it created

too many assumption of ‘rewards’ in these few pages

and the disappearance of the concept of value, this book argues, has paradoxically made it much easier for this crucial term ‘value’ a concept that lies at the heart of economic thought – to be used and abused in whatever way on e might find useful

9

productive vs unproductive activities

productivity law

18

i conclude in ch 9, only thru an open debate about value.. can we help steer our economies in a direction that will produce more genuine innovation and less ineq, and which will also transform the financial sector into one that is truly focused on nurturing value creation in the real econ..

that’s the goal..?

19

we must reconsider the stories we are telling about who the value creators are, and what hat says to us about how we define activities as economically productive and unproductive..

let’s say we all are.. or aren’t.. let’s quit measuring what people do .. who people are

words matter: we need a new vocab for policymaking

let’s not policy make

38

in effect his (adam smith – born 1723) policy advice.. instead of ‘wasting the surplus on paying for unproductive labour, it should be saved and invested in more production so that the whole nation could become richer..  ie: should switch from valuing books, statues, picture, jewels… to machines, factories (to improve workers productivity)

his 3 kinds of labor: wages, profits, rents

40

smith was confused about the distinction between material and immaterial production.. for smith.. the servant ‘adds’ no value that could be used by the master on something other than, literally, keeping the servant alive..  smith’s analysis of ‘free market’ was closely tied to his understanding of production, and the need to limit rent seeking behaviour..

41

david ricardo – 1810 – saw value in amount of time needed to produce it (commodity)

43

ricardo developed his celebrated theory of rent..(the more productive land already in use yields a higher profit that the less productive)  ricardo defined rent as a transfer of profit to landlords simply because they had a monopoly of a scarce asset..

47

karl marx – born 1818

48

(still via marx) – if commodities are exchanged – sold – the are said to have an exchange value.. if you produce a commodity which you consume yourself fit does not have an exchange value. exchange value crystallizes the value inherent in commodities

rather.. petrifies the value.. in both ways

marsh exchange law

56

marx’s attempt to define the production boundary was more rigorous than those of smith and ricardo and long way from petty and king. he intro’d the idea of labour power as an objective and invariable standard of value, building on the essential premise shared by earlier economists that value derived from labour. he also shared w them the belief that govt was unproductive..

skimmed.. looked at every page.. but dang.. it’s all about money/measure

277

the question remains: *what direction should the economy take if it si to benefit the **greatest number of people

*the direction of money less ness.. because it has to be about **all the people..

278

indeed a key way to tackle some of society’s most pressing problems today is to learn lessons from historical periods in which gold ambitions were set to tackle difficult tech problems.. ie: man on moon 1\ via nasa and darpa.. didn’t outsource to private sector  2\ appollo mission required diff types of actors and sectors to collab

we need to realize that our history is filled w a ton of illegit data

mufleh humanity lawwe have seen advances in every aspect of our lives except our humanity – Luma Mufleh

279

a green revolution will require deliberate and conscious changes in social values: a redirection of the *entire economy, **transforming production, distributions and consumption in all sectors

i like green but.. we need a quiet revolution ..  *sans irrelevants.. ie: money/measure.. via **have/need ness

280

if we cannot dream of a better future and try to make it happen, there is no real reason why we should care about value. and this perhaps is the greatest lesson of all

graeber values law

we have the means to facil that today.. ie: tech as it could be.. via 2 convers.. as infra because what we need most is the energy of 7bn alive people.. to get us back/to meadows undisturbed ecosystem

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