so.. imagine our idiosyncratic jargon (the language going on in our minds.. our thumbprint-ness) as cipher text..

ie: .. our encryption/protection/privacy – comes from the too much ness of documenting everything. begging you to connect with the actual person in order to decode. (like we create our own layer of security – much like what David writes about what the too much ness of bureaucracy does for us – in a bad way)

and again – not even that you couldn’t decode it.. but you have no desire to (for bad) because you’re too busy being. the desire to decode it (for good) is embedded in a desire to connect with the person.

– – –

wikipedia small






In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding messages or information in such a way that only authorized parties can read it. Encryption does not of itself prevent interception, but denies the message content to the interceptor. In an encryption scheme, the message or information, referred to as plaintext, is encrypted using an encryption algorithm, generating ciphertext that can only be read if decrypted. For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-random encryption key generated by an algorithm. It is in principle possible to decrypt the message without possessing the key, but, for a well-designed encryption scheme, large computational resources and skill are required. An authorised recipient can easily decrypt the message with the key provided by the originator to recipients, but not to unauthorised interceptors.

imagine authorization comes simply from caring enough to decrypt. and you would have to care enough.. because decryption wouldn’t be from some time-efficient algorithm ness.. but from time-consuming knowing a person ness. ie: knowing more than one of their stories as credential.

so say – without money or any other extrinsic motivators, we flip (what we now call) life in a way. meaning – who’s together in a space is per choice – has meaning.

credentialing/labeling/interviewing/applying/pitching becomes irrelevant because with all the time tech/efficiency was meant to free up… we use for being together. but not just being together.. being together with your tribe. doing the thing you can’t not do. so very much apprenticeship on steroids. but no one is cheating/conning to get in somewhere. rather.. they can’t not be in the presence of that person/mentor/activity/art.

and that’s how we know/decrypt.

with everyone (it has to be everyone or it won’t work) allowed the luxury to do something else (ie: whatever they want, the thing they can’t not do), no one has the time/desire to decrypt/break-in for bad. and we don’t need to spend/waste time in meetings/trainings/interviews..  because we are together enough. awake enough. to me – that’s the singularity.

you don’t have to spend your time inspecting me and i don’t have to spend my time jumping through hoops for or hiding from you. my/your natural language/thinking/mind is enough encryption – to allow for enough space to set/keep us all free.

how do i hide






– – – –



document everything

ps in the open

global systemic change

idiosyncratic jargon

Moxie Marlinspike



@filosottile (via @leashless rt)

I’m giving up on long-term PGP keys, and it’s not even about the UX. My last signed message. blog.filippo.io/giving-up-on-l…

But it just didn’t work.

First, there’s the adoption issue ..

Then, there’s the UX problem..

But the real issues I realized are more subtle. I never felt confident in the security of my long term keys.

A long term key is as secure as the minimum common denominator of your security practices over its lifetime. It’s the weak link.

Worse, long term keys patterns like collecting signatures and printing fingerprints on business cards discourage practices that would otherwise be obvious hygiene: rotating keys often, having different keys for different devices, compartmentalization. It actually encourages expanding the attack surface by making backups of the key.


And all this for what gain?

“Well, of course, long term trust.”


these days I think I care much more about forward secrecy, deniability and ephemerality than I do about iron clad trust.


then goes on to explain all the pgp ish (to me) things he is doing instead.

whoa. imagining all the people taking notes.. and following suit..

all this gain for what..?

there’s a nother way.. based on idiosyncratic jargon ness.. and gershenfeld something else law


Zeynep Tufekci (@zeynep) tweeted at 5:58 AM – 10 Mar 2017 :

Before Snowden revelations, there was so little encryption. Now it’s widespread. We should now focus on device safety: demand off switches. (http://twitter.com/zeynep/status/840185196569874433?s=17)


Syamant Sandhir (@Syamant) tweeted at 3:51 AM – 18 Jul 2017 :

IBM’S plan to encrypt unthinkable amounts of sensitive data https://t.co/1kBwGQMB3r (http://twitter.com/Syamant/status/887248414060167170?s=17)